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STEPS TOWARD ABOLISHING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
INCREMENTALISM IN THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY
Melanie Kalmanson*
While scholars seem united on the sentiment that abolition is the ultimate resting
place for capital sentencing in the United States, their arguments vary as to how the
system will reach that point. For example, Carol and Jordan Steiker argue that the sys-
temic disarray of capital sentencing in the United States is a result of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s attempt to constitutionalize capital sentencing.1 This Article contends
that the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence that has developed since
1972, when the Court reset capital sentencing in Furman v. Georgia,2 has aided the
Court in gradually narrowing capital punishment, as a result of the controlling “evolv-
ing standards of decency” standard.3 Specifically, the Court has narrowed capital
punishment with respect to who may be sentenced to death,4 how sentences of death
are imposed,5 and how defendants are executed.6 As a result, this Article contends
that the “evolving standards of decency” standard paves the path toward abolition.
First, this Article shows that incrementalism has led to the current landscape of
capital punishment in the United States.7 Then, the Article contends that an incre-
mental approach to reaching abolition is inherent in the governing “evolving stan-
dards of decency” standard and the most effective and realistic way of achieving
abolition.8 Finally, the Article proposes the next steps in this approach to eliminating
the death penalty in America.9
* JD, magna cum laude, Florida State University (2016). Melanie Kalmanson served as
a staff attorney to former Justice Barbara J. Pariente of the Supreme Court of Florida from
August 2016 until January 2019. After her clerkship, she entered private practice. Also since
her clerkship, Melanie has written and published several pieces on the effects of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida and the death penalty generally.
1 See CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (2016).
2 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
3 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
4 See, e.g., id. at 318; Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986).
5 See, e.g., Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
6 See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62 (2008).
7 See infra Part III.
8 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312; infra Part IV.
9 See infra Section IV.B.
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INTRODUCTION
Since capital punishment resurfaced after the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Furman v. Georgia, invalidating capital sentencing across the United
States in 1972,10 scholars and courts have contemplated the flaws in capital sentenc-
ing systems across the country. Most scholars predict the United States will ultimately
abolish capital punishment for one reason or another.11 Most scholars also agree that
the point of abolition is getting closer and closer.12 Society seems to support this
10 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
11 See, e.g., STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 4; Austin Sarat et al., The Rhetoric of Aboli-
tion: Continuity and Change in the Struggle Against America’s Death Penalty, 1900–2010, 107
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2017) (“Today the United States seems to be on the road
to abolishing the death penalty.”). But see Ross Kleinstuber et al., Into the Abyss: The Uninten-
ded Consequences of Death Penalty Abolition, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 185, 186 (2016)
(arguing that abolition will have unintended consequences that may be harmful to defendants).
12 See, e.g., David Von Drehle, The Death of the Death Penalty: Why the Era of Capital
Punishment Is Ending, TIME (June 8, 2015), http://time.com/deathpenalty/ [https://perma.cc
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sentiment, too, as public support for capital punishment continues to decline.13 This
Article agrees that abolition is the ultimate destination for capital sentencing, even
with a post-Kennedy Supreme Court; of course, the time it will take to get there is
unclear and may be delayed as a result of the new makeup.14
While scholars seem united that abolition is the end point, their suggested paths
for arriving there vary.15 For example, Carol and Jordan Steiker (the Steikers) have
shown that the Supreme Court’s constitutionalization of capital sentencing produced
unintended consequences on the path to abolition.16 They argue that the Court’s
effort to impose constitutional safeguards in this context has exposed the impossibility
of making the death penalty fair or principled, which will eventually lead to its de-
mise.17 Others argue that abolition is the only solution to the arbitrary and capricious
way in which defendants are sentenced to death, even after Furman.18 Specifically,
for example, Carla Edmondson points to the “future dangerousness” consideration
in many states’ capital sentencing schemes as affording juries far too much discre-
tion such that the sentencing decision is unconstitutionally arbitrary.19
This Article makes a new contribution to this discussion, explaining that the
Court’s constitutionalization of capital punishment, specifically through the Court’s
Eighth Amendment “evolving standards of decency” framework, has fundamentally
destabilized death-penalty jurisprudence. Through this framework, the Court set the
stage for abolition by creating an incremental approach to abolition, under which the
Court has already begun narrowing the death penalty. Whether deliberately or not,
this Article argues that courts have incrementally narrowed the death penalty since
/AR72-U537] (stating that the United States’ “troubled [capital-sentencing] system is creeping
into view”).
13 See Gallup Poll—For First Time, Majority of Americans Prefer Life Sentence to Capital
Punishment, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news
/gallup-poll-for-first-time-majority-of-americans-prefer-life-sentence-to-capital-punishment
[https://perma.cc/J3VS-6T5N] [hereinafter Gallup Poll]; Public Opinion, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/public-opinion-polls [https://per
ma.cc/KSH4-EC8Z] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).
14 This Article only addresses capital punishment in the United States. Therefore, it should
be assumed throughout that discussion is of only capital punishment in the United States.
Likewise, unless otherwise noted, “Court” refers to the U.S. Supreme Court.
15 E.g., Sarat et al., supra note 11, at 758 (“There are, of course, many possible explanations
for the changing situation of capital punishment.”); see A.M. Kirkpatrick, The Abolition of the
Death Penalty, 13 CRIM. L.Q. 308, 308–09 (1970) (“Society would be better served by . . . the
abolition of the death sentence and the penalty of execution. Abolition will neither stop nor re-
duce murder, but the evidence is that it will not result in any increase in the taking of human
life. . . . If this matter can be examined rationally and dispassionately there are few who will not
agree that the death penalty should be completely abolished and that it will be in due course.”).
16 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 4.
17 Id.
18 See generally Carla Edmondson, Nothing Is Certain but Death: Why Future Dangerous-
ness Mandates Abolition of the Death Penalty, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 857 (2016).
19 See id. at 916–17.
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the Court’s decision in Furman. These incremental changes are a result of the efforts
of abolitionists—attorneys and policymakers—who have continuously sought to
undermine the constitutionality of capital sentencing from all angles.20 The latest
argument is that lethal injection—the most common method of execution in the
United States today—violates the Eighth Amendment, at least in certain circum-
stances.21 While the Court has granted incremental and marginal victories, it has
refused opportunities to outlaw capital sentencing or executions altogether.22
Instead, the Court has taken a more gradual approach. This Article contends that
the “evolving standards of decency” framework, which applies to Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, poses a graver threat to the death penalty than broader attacks
on capital punishment. This Article explains that the constitution of the incremental
approach that inheres in this guiding framework is likely the most realistic way to
achieve abolition. Specifically, incrementalism—employed differently than we have
seen in other contexts—will ultimately lead to the successful elimination of capital
punishment by signaling, with each gradual change, a shift in society’s acceptance
of capital punishment. As society’s acceptance of the death penalty continues to
decrease,23 the support for eliminating capital sentencing strengthens, as inhered by
the “evolving standards of decency” framework under which courts may effectuate
changes to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
This Article proceeds as follows. Parts I and II explain the necessary framework
for this discussion, starting with the “evolving standards of decency” framework for
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and then the theory of “incrementalism” as a
progressive approach to eliminating a contested aspect of the law.24 Canvassing this
jurisprudence on capital sentencing, Part III illuminates how incrementalism under-
lies the history of changes to capital sentencing since 1972.25 Part IV contends that
incrementalism, as a result of the “evolving standards of decency” framework ex-
plained in Part I, paves the route to abolishing capital sentencing.26 Part IV also
explains the likely next steps in this incremental process—between now and abolition.27
20 See Sarat et al., supra note 11, at 758 (suggesting that abolitionists steer this progres-
sion by framing the debate).
21 See Bucklew v. Precythe, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases
/bucklew-v-precythe/ [https://perma.cc/8LVF-5QHV] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) (presenting
the issue whether executing an inmate with rare and severe medical condition would violate
the Eighth Amendment); Madison v. Alabama, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com
/case-files/cases/madison-v-alabama/ [https://perma.cc/E256-3RZM] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020)
(presenting the issue whether executing a defendant who no longer remembers his crime
violates the Eighth Amendment).
22 See, e.g., Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1054 (2018) (denying petition for writ
of certiorari).
23 See Sarat et al., supra note 11, at 758.
24 See infra Parts I–II.
25 See infra Part III.
26 See infra Part IV.
27 See infra Part IV.
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I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT “EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY” FRAMEWORK
Based on the language of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,28 the
U.S. Supreme Court stated in Atkins v. Virginia that “[t]he Eighth Amendment suc-
cinctly prohibits ‘[e]xcessive’ sanctions.”29 However, the question that remains
unanswered is how courts should determine what constitutes “excessive.”
To determine whether a punishment is excessive, the Court has explained that
courts should be guided by standards “that currently prevail,” or “the evolving stan-
dards of decency.”30 Quoting Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Trop v. Dulles, the
Court wrote in Atkins: “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.”31 The Court explained “that the ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’”32
Likewise, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Thompson v. Oklahoma,
explained:
The authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical pro-
hibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments,
but they made no attempt to define the contours of that category.
They delegated that task to future generations of judges who have
been guided by the “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”33
Applying the “evolving standards of decency” standard in the capital-sentencing
context, Justice Stevens explained that the Court “review[s] the work product of
state legislatures and sentencing juries, and . . . carefully consider[s] the reasons why
a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types of cases.”34
As Justice Stevens signaled in Thompson, courts, guided by the “evolving stan-
dards of decency,” review Eighth Amendment challenges on a case-by-case basis,
or group-by-group when the court can define a category of defendants or cases. This
Article contends that the case-by-case approach to Eighth Amendment challenges,
28 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
29 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
31 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plural-
ity opinion) (alteration in original)).
32 Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
33 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop,
356 U.S. at 101).
34 Id. at 822.
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which was likely an organic result of the Court’s decision-making process rather than
an explicit choice, produced an incremental atmosphere in which the Court has dis-
sected the death penalty over time, rather than reviewed holistically the validity of death
as a punishment.35 Part II explains in-depth the theory and history of incrementalism.
II. WHAT IS INCREMENTALISM?
Before explaining how incrementalism underlies the evolution of capital punish-
ment in the United States since 1972, it is important to understand incrementalism
generally. Incrementalism is defined as “a model of the policy process” by which
“[p]olicies are made . . . through a pluralistic process of partisan mutual adjustment
in which a multiplicity of participants focus on proposals differing only incre-
mentally from the status quo.”36 With incrementalism, “[s]ignificant policy change
occurs, if at all, through a gradual accumulation of small changes.”37
In fact, incrementalism has been the key to several legal revolutions in this coun-
try.38 Recognizing that radical change in the law is difficult to obtain and requires
support from several players with differing viewpoints, leaders seeking to effect
change use incremental steps to reach the ultimate goal.39 This can be seen in several
contexts, both through evolving jurisprudence and legislative changes, as explained,
in turn, below.
A. Evolving Jurisprudence
The incremental approach to achieving jurisprudential change involves selecting
key cases that, if successful, will accomplish a step toward the ultimate goal.40 Key
cases present a favorable plaintiff whose claim presents the specific circumstances that
will likely garner support of a majority of the reviewing court to make the intended
35 That being said, Justice Breyer and other Justices have continuously argued that the
Court should reconsider the validity of death as a punishment. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross,
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would ask for full briefing on a more
basic question: whether the death penalty violates the Constitution.”).
36 Michael Hayes, Incrementalism and Public Policy-Making, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLO-
PEDIAS (Apr. 2017), http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001
.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-133 [https://perma.cc/4A4F-ZLDQ].
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39 See Brown v. Board at Fifty: “With an Even Hand,” LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www
.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html [https://perma.cc/K687-ATQK] (last visited Feb. 24,
2020) [hereinafter Brown at Fifty].
40 See, e.g., How States Abolish the Death Penalty, INT’L COMM’N AGAINST DEATH
PENALTY, https://icomdp.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Report-How-States-abolition
-the-death-penalty.pdf [https://perma.cc/JKY2-UQBD] (stating that while some countries
“proceeded directly to full abolition,” others took “intermediary steps,” or an incremental
approach, when the direct approach is impractical).
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jurisprudential change.41 Both Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg employed
this approach in leading the charge toward racial equality and gender equality,
respectively, under the U.S. Constitution.
In the 1950s, Thurgood Marshall, working for the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), led an incremental attack against “the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’” from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Plessy
v. Ferguson.42 The end goal: racial equality in the law and desegregation of the
school system.43 After addressing graduate and professional schools in Sweatt v.
Painter44—where the U.S. Supreme Court held that “a segregated law school for
Negroes could not provide them equal education opportunities” as those offered to
white students45—Marshall gradually led the Court to determining that segregation
violated the U.S. Constitution “in five separate cases gathered together under”
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.46 With each case, Marshall helped the
Court take one step toward the ultimate goal—complete desegregation—which he
ultimately accomplished in Brown, where the Court determined that “segregation
of children in public schools solely on the basis of race . . . deprive[s] the children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities.”47
Building on what Marshall started, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the pioneer of gender
equality in the 1970s, similarly employed an incremental strategy in leading the
fight for gender equality under the Fourteenth Amendment.48 As co-founder and
director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Women’s Rights Project,49
Ginsburg recognized that immediately rendering women equal to men under the law
would face opposition from, or seem too radical for, a majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court at the time.50 As a result, Ginsburg strategically selected cases that would
41 See, e.g., LINDA HIRSHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: HOW SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR AND RUTH
BADER GINSBURG WENT TO THE SUPREME COURT AND CHANGED THE WORLD 94 (2015).
42 See 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Brown at Fifty, supra
note 39.
43 Brown at Fifty, supra note 39.
44 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
45 Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (addressing Sweatt).
46 Brown at Fifty, supra note 39.
47 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. See generally Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying
the holding of Brown to the school district in D.C.); Stephen J. Dubner, In Praise of Incremen-
talism, FREAKONOMICS (Oct. 26, 2016), http://freakonomics.com/podcast/in-praise-of-incre
mentalism/ [https://perma.cc/RD8F-3QYL].
48 Ginsburg’s efforts in this regard have been summarized and detailed in many works. See
generally HIRSHMAN, supra note 41. This Article merely gives an overview of Ginsburg’s work.
49 Id. at 56–58; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/womens-his
tory/ruth-bader-ginsburg [https://perma.cc/YL73-UFWE] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020); Tribute:
The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/tri
bute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff [https://perma.cc/6VTR-XTQJ] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Tribute].
50 See HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 70–71.
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incrementally lead the Court to this goal.51 Ginsburg explained her strategic choice
of cases, stating: “Not all feminist issues should be litigated now . . . because some
are losers, given the current political climate, and could set back our efforts to de-
velop favorable law.”52
Starting with Reed v. Reed53 in 1971, for which Ginsburg authored the ACLU’s
brief,54 the Court “invalidated an Idaho statute that automatically gave preference
to men for appointment as administrator of a deceased person’s estate.”55 After Reed,
a law discriminating on the basis of sex passed constitutional muster as long as it
“fairly and substantially advance[d] the legislature’s purpose in passing it.”56 While
this standard was “better than the low standard of mere rationality [it was] not close
to Ginsburg’s aspiration to have the Court treat distinctions based on sex the same
as race” by reviewing them under strict scrutiny.57
Two years later, Ginsburg presented the Court with Frontiero v. Richardson,58
in which a male plaintiff—with whom the Justices could easier identify—had been
denied spousal benefits from his wife’s “work in the uniformed forces because he
failed to prove economic dependency on his wife, a condition not required for wives
of male members to qualify for the same benefits.”59 Presenting a male plaintiff
helped Ginsburg demonstrate that “sex-based distinctions harm men and women”
alike.60 Linda Hirshman explains that, at conference, “seven justices voted to strike
down the air force scheme.”61
Even more pertinent to Ginsburg’s goal, Justice Brennan had come to agree with
Ginsburg that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review for gender discrimi-
nation.62 But Brennan could not get a majority.63 Ultimately, Frontiero was a “near
miss at getting the standard of review changed.”64 Although Ginsburg did not prevail
in Frontiero, the facts forced the Court to consider harm to a male rather than a
female caused by gender discrimination.65
Ginsburg again presented a male plaintiff in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,66 a single
father whose wife had passed away challenging “a provision in the Social Security
51 See id. at 59.
52 Id. at 64.
53 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
54 See HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 55.
55 Tribute, supra note 49.
56 HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 70.
57 Id.; see id. at 76.
58 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
59 Tribute, supra note 49.
60 Id.
61 HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 75.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 76.
64 Id. at 77.
65 Id.
66 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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Act that denied to widowed fathers benefits afforded to widowed mothers.”67 On the
government’s appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of this
provision of the Social Security Act.68 In a huge victory for women’s rights—
although still not reaching equalization between sex and race—the Court held, citing
Frontiero, that the “gender-based classification” in the Social Security Act violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 This conclusion signaled,
as Ginsburg originally intended, that gender stereotypes have no place in the law
and should be reviewed with heightened scrutiny.70
Marshall’s and Ginsburg’s approaches to achieving racial and gender equality
under the law exemplify how incrementalism has been successfully employed in shift-
ing jurisprudence toward the ultimate goal. In addition to effectuating jurisprudential
change, this country has seen incrementalism employed in legislative changes—
most notably in abortion, as the next Section explains.
B. Incremental Legislation
Another way in which incrementalism has been employed in the United States
is through incremental legislation, inching toward the ultimate goal. The most
notable example of this is the way in which the pro-life movement approached its
goal of banning abortion after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v.
Wade protected the right to abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment.71 But incre-
mental abortion legislation was employed both before Roe—broadening the right to
abortion—and after Roe—narrowing the right to abortion.72
Before Roe, “the political process . . . had been slowly liberalizing the laws state
by state.”73 In fact, Ginsburg (before joining the Court) criticized Roe for being too radi-
cal and hindering the incremental political process that was broadening the right to
abortion.74 While she agreed with the bottom line—legalizing or protecting abortion—
Ginsburg contended that an “incremental strategy” to abortion legislation would
have “avoided or minimized” the backlash by abortion opposition that Roe caused.75
67 Tribute, supra note 49; accord Ruth Bader Ginsburg, supra note 49. Hirshman writes:
“Had Stephen Wiesenfeld not existed, Ruth Bader Ginsburg might have had to invent him.”
HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 94.
68 HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 95–97 (discussing the process for the Court to accept
jurisdiction in Weinberger).
69 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 653.
70 See HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 101; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
533–34 (1996).
71 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72 See MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 58–91
(2015).
73 HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 81.
74 Id.
75 Id.; see id. at 62.
596 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:587
Perhaps, as Ginsburg predicted, the Court’s decision in Roe marked a turning
point in the incremental strategy for abortion legislation. After Roe, incremental leg-
islation worked in the opposite direction—narrowing the right to abortion. For
example, “[w]ithin a year of the Roe decision, Missouri passed its first post-Roe
anti-abortion law.”76 Although the Supreme Court invalidated the Missouri law, the
anti-abortion, or pro-life, “movement would keep passing laws, looking for holes
in the Roe decision and for any legal method to restrict abortion.”77
These efforts were reignited when the Court decided Planned Parenthood of
Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey fourteen years after Roe, affirming the central holding
of Roe but changing the framework for reviewing the constitutionality of abortion
restrictions.78 After Casey, the pro-life movement employed an incrementalist strategy
to further limit women’s access to abortion. “Incrementalists lobbied state legisla-
tures to pass laws that the Supreme Court might actually uphold,” focusing “on
middle-ground restrictions.”79 Once incrementalism gained momentum, “pro-lifers
across the ideological spectrum generally viewed it as a useful tool for limiting
access to abortion.”80
While some pro-life supporters believed that the incremental approach would
eventually lead to a successful challenge against Roe v. Wade,81 absolutists viewed
the incrementalism approach as a “waste of scarce movement resources” that advanced
“compromise regulations,” which undermined the ultimate goal of eliminating abor-
tion altogether.82 In other words, those who view anything but abolition a failure
thought that incrementalism was not aggressive enough in the fight against abortion.83
Perhaps the absolutists were correct. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, which invalidated Texas’s extremely restrictive
abortion legislation—House Bill 2(HB2)—indicates that the pro-life, incremental
76 Id. at 150. This bill “allowed doctors, nurses, and hospitals to refuse to perform an abor-
tion when it violated their moral, ethical, or religious beliefs.” Id. The bill also required
“informed consent by the woman considering an abortion, her spouse if married, and the
consent of the parents of an unmarried minor under the age of eighteen” and “banned
abortions performed after twelve weeks of pregnancy that involved the injection of a saline
solution into the mother’s womb.” Id.
77 Id. at 151.
78 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833–34 (1992); see also
HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 195 (explaining more about the “undue burden” standard).
79 ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 59; see Editorial, An Ohio Bill Would Ban All Abortions.
It’s Part of a Bigger Plan., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/25
/opinion/ohio-abortion-ban-bill.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur [https://nyti.ms/2pEqK
cX] [hereinafter Ohio Bill] (“[E]ven if the bill doesn’t become law, it could pave the way for
other, somewhat less extreme measures to pass, seeming reasonable by comparison.”).
80 ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 59.
81 Ohio Bill, supra note 79.
82 ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 60.
83 See id.
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approach to eliminating abortion was not necessarily successful.84 Hellerstedt made
clear that the Court’s view on abortion has not changed much since its 1992 decision
in Casey, as the Court merely applied the “undue burden” standard from Casey to
invalidate HB2.85 Although, some scholars speculated and we may now be seeing
the effects of a new wave of incrementalism in abortion legislation and a rise in liti-
gation seeking to overturn Roe in light of Kennedy’s retirement in 2018.86 Regard-
less of one’s views on the strategy’s success, it is clear that the pro-life movement
employed incrementalism in anti-abortion legislation,87 similarly to Marshall’s and
Ginsburg’s approaches to racial and gender equality, respectively.
Having explained the ways in which incrementalism has been successfully em-
ployed in other contexts, Part III applies this background and explains how incremental-
ism underlies the changes courts have implemented in capital sentencing since the
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, which instituted modern
capital sentencing.88
III. HOW INCREMENTALISM HAS SHAPED THE CURRENT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM
Today, defendants are sentenced to the ultimate punishment—death—for capital
crimes, which, in most jurisdictions, involve the purposeful killing of another human
being, or first-degree murder.89 Not every defendant convicted of a capital crime,
84 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Departure of Kennedy, ‘Firewall for Abortion Rights,’
Could End Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27
/us/politics/kennedy-abortion-roe-v-wade.html [https://nyti.ms/2lFnXOi]; Li Zhou, 10 Legal
Experts on the Future of Roe v. Wade After Kennedy, VOX (July 2, 2018, 7:00AM), https://
www.vox.com/2018/7/2/17515154/kennedy-retirement-roe-wade [https://perma.cc/LH57-AE
TE]; see also Amy Howe, Justices Grant Stay, Block Louisiana Abortion Law From Going
Into Effect, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 7, 2019, 10:46 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/02
/justices-grant-stay-block-louisiana-abortion-law-from-going-into-effect/ [https://perma.cc
/WYQ4-U76Q]. Indeed, oral argument is scheduled for March 4, 2020, in June Medical
Services, LLC v. Gee, in which the Supreme Court will review the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals’ decision upholding a Louisiana statute requiring physicians who perform abortions to
have admitting privileges at a local hospital. June Medical Services LLC v. Gee, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/june-medical-services-llc-v-gee-3/ [https://perma
.cc/4JJ7-DSYD] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
87 For more on the history of both sides’ strategy with abortion legislation and the abortion
debate in general, see generally MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE
V. WADE TO THE PRESENT (Cambridge UP 2020).
88 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (finding that the death penalty violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in three different cases).
89 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 11 (“The scope of first-degree murder to this day
centers on the original Pennsylvania definition, which focused on ‘deliberate and premeditated’
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however, is sentenced to death. Before a defendant convicted of a capital crime is
sentenced to death, courts and juries must consider several factors, and ultimately deter-
mine that the defendant’s crime is among the “worst of the worst.”90 But this multi-
consideration process has not always stood between defendants and the death penalty.
As this Part explains, the list of factors that determine which capital defendants
are sentenced to death has continuously evolved since 1972. This Part demonstrates
how incrementalism—in a different form than it has been employed in the contexts
explained in Part II—underlies our current system of capital punishment. The guiding
standard for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence inherently contemplates incrementalism
by indicating an ever-evolving society.91 Thus, by its own terms, the “evolving stan-
dards of decency” framework benefits from an incremental approach.
Constrained by this incremental standard, courts have opted for incremental
changes when faced with Eighth Amendment challenges to capital sentencing.92 This
Article contends that such incremental changes will ultimately lead to the final
abolition of capital sentencing when the proper foundation for doing so exists—
namely, the jurisprudential foundation, political atmosphere, and societal support.93
Before 1972, capital sentencing was the “Wild, Wild West”; there were “no
rules.”94 Under that regime, it was unclear what jurisdiction controlled the imposi-
tion of capital sentences and executions, and standards or regulations for imposing
and executing the death penalty were minimal.95 As a result, the Furman Court invali-
dated the death penalty in all fifty states, determining that the way states sentenced
defendants to death was unconstitutionally arbitrary.96 Four years later, however,
pressured by pro–death penalty activists, the Court reinstituted capital sentencing.97
After Furman, several states reenacted the death penalty through capital sen-
tencing schemes that aimed to minimize arbitrariness. They did so by requiring
either the jury or trial judge to make fact-based findings, such as aggravating factors,
murder and murder committed in the course of other serious felonies.”). Defendants used to
be subjected to death for a much broader array of crimes, as Carol and Jordan Steiker explain.
See id. at 9–11.
90 E.g., Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1138 (Fla. 2000) (Anstead, J., dissenting). Carol
and Jordan Steiker also explain the history of jury involvement. See STEIKER & STEIKER,
supra note 1, at 11–12.
91 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1957) (plurality opinion) (indicating that the
Eighth Amendment should be considered under “evolving standards of decency”).
92 See How States Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 40, at 33 (discussing how some
countries “proceeded directly to full abolition,” others take “intermediary steps,” or an incre-
mental approach, when the direct approach is impractical).
93 See Sarat et al., supra note 11, at 759.
94 See, e.g., STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 7 (listing some of the varying early capital
offenses ranging from murder to cursing near a child and man-stealing).
95 See id. at 6–8.
96 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curiam); see also STEIKER &
STEIKER, supra note 1, at 2–3.
97 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 2.
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before sentencing the defendant to death.98 Other states repealed the death penalty
or eliminated death as a viable punishment altogether. 
In fact, we continue to see states repealing capital punishment or, for some other
reason, rendering death a non-viable punishment—even in the past few years. As of
March 2018, death is not a viable punishment in nineteen states.99 Since then, numerous
states have considered bills proposing abolition,100 and several states actually have
repealed the death penalty.101 As of January 2020, death was not a viable punishment
in twenty-five states.102
Other decreases in capital sentencing, this Article contends, resulted from incre-
mentalism driven by the “evolving standards of decency” standard that controls Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. As pro-lifers intended with their “middle-ground [abor-
tion] restrictions,”103 the Supreme Court has incrementally limited capital punish-
ment through a series of cases. These changes, which usually begin in the states,104
can generally be split into three categories, each of which is addressed below: (1)
which defendants are eligible to be sentenced to death; (2) how sentences of death
are imposed; and (3) how defendants are executed.
Other scholars present varied explanations for these changes. For example, the
Steikers argue that these changes resulted from the Supreme Court’s failed attempt
to constitutionally regulate capital sentencing, which ultimately destabilized the
system.105 Others argue these changes were a result of the Court attempting to
implement its constitutional standards and ensure that capital punishment is employed
in a way that is consistent with defendants’ other fundamental rights.106 This Article
98 Aggravating factors are characteristics of the crime that make it “worse,” whereas
mitigating circumstances, cumulatively referred to as mitigation, are characteristics of the
crime—usually the defendant’s background and character—that make the defendant seem
less deserving of the death penalty. See, e.g., 1973 Fla. Laws 20–21.
99 Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo
.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/URU2-UXCG] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020);
see STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 18; Sarat et al., supra note 11, at 758.
100 See Sylvia Krohn, Numerous States Consider Repeal of the Death Penalty, AM. BAR
ASS’N (May 10, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_repre
sentation/project_press/2019/spring/numerous-states-consider-repeal-of-the-death-penalty/
[https://perma.cc/7982-KRFY]; Recent Legislative Activity, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/recent-legislative-activity [https://perma.cc
/93XG-CE8F] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
101 See State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and
-federal-info/state-by-state [https://perma.cc/73VN-2FQE] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
102 Id.
103 ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 59.
104 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 8; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
105 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 4.
106 See, e.g., Edmondson, supra note 18, at 859 (discussing the Court’s concern with arbi-
trary jury decisions and the legitimacy of death penalty); Sarat et al., supra note 11, at 760
(stating that death penalty opposition has shifted from a moral framework to a focus on sen-
tencing and procedural concerns).
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contextualizes these changes as the path toward abolition through an incremental
process that inheres in the Court’s “evolving standards of decency” framework.
A. Defendants Who Are Eligible to Be Sentenced to Death
The first aspect of capital sentencing that the Court has narrowed since Furman
is who may be sentenced to death, or the category of defendants eligible for death.
When Furman was decided, anyone could be sentenced to death after being con-
victed of a capital crime so long as the sentence of death was imposed in a way that
was not considered arbitrary.107
Today, only defendants who were at least eighteen years of age at the time of their
crime and of sufficient intellectual ability—and, of course, prosecuted in a state that
has the death penalty—are eligible for death.108 This Section explains the litigation that
led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions rendering certain groups of individuals
ineligible for death—namely, defendants who have some sort of mental incapacity and
juveniles, or defendants who were under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
1. Mental Incapacity
First, the U.S. Supreme Court determined it violates the Eighth Amendment to
execute defendants who prove their mental incapacity.109 This includes defendants
who are insane and those who have intellectual disabilities.110 Between 1972 and 2002,
the mental capacity requirement for death eligibility transpired from no restriction
to sane and not intellectually disabled.111 This change shifted the death penalty to
focus on defendants who not only committed first-degree murder, but did so with the
mental capacity to appreciate the criminality and gravity of his or her actions.112 In
theory, it is this understanding of one’s actions and conscious choice to nevertheless
commit the crime that renders the defendant deserving of the ultimate punishment.
In 1986, the Court relied on the Eighth Amendment to declare in Ford v.
Wainwright what every “State in the Union” had already determined: executing an
insane prisoner is against the moral code of “civilized societies.”113 The Court ex-
plained that this “rule” was deeply rooted in society:
107 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
108 See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty
is unconstitutional if applied to defendants under eighteen years of age); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the death penalty was unconstitutional when applied to de-
fendants with intellectual disabilities).
109 See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
110 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986) (stating
death penalties against the criminally insane are unconstitutional).
111 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
112 See id.
113 Ford, 477 U.S. at 408–09.
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This ancestral legacy has not outlived its time. Today, no State in
the Union permits the execution of the insane. It is clear that the
ancient and humane limitation upon the State’s ability to execute
its sentences has as firm a hold upon the jurisprudence of today as
it had centuries ago in England. The various reasons put forth in
support of the common-law restriction have no less logical, moral,
and practical force than they did when first voiced. For today, no
less than before, we may seriously question the retributive value of
executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been
singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life. Similarly,
the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who
has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity
is still vivid today. And the intuition that such an execution simply
offends humanity is evidently shared across this Nation. Faced
with such widespread evidence of a restriction upon sovereign
power, this Court is compelled to conclude that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death
upon a prisoner who is insane.114
Thus, Ford is a clear example of how “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,” or “contemporary values,” of which the Court con-
siders the states’ actions evidence, drive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.115
The Court again relied on the “evolving standards of decency” standard to hold
in Atkins v. Virginia “that the mentally retarded should be categorically excluded
from execution.”116 Again, societal acceptance was key in the Court adopting this
change. Similar to how states had already barred insane inmates from execution before
the Court declared that doing so was unconstitutional, the Court observed that a “large
number of States prohibit[ed] the execution of mentally retarded persons”117—now
known as persons with intellectual disabilities.118 In fact, the Court determined that “a
national consensus [had] developed against” the execution of intellectually disabled
defendants.119 Thus, consistent with this consensus, the Court held in Atkins that the
Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing intellectually disabled defendants
to death.120 Further explaining its holding in Atkins, the Court wrote in Hall v. Florida:
114 Id. at 408–10 (internal citations omitted).
115 Id. at 406 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
116 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
117 Id. at 315.
118 See, e.g., Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/intellectual-disability-and-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/3NVJ
-L2HV] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) (discussing Atkins’ effect on people with intellectual
disabilities).
119 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; accord Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).
120 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
602 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:587
No legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a per-
son with intellectual disability. To do so contravenes the Eighth
Amendment, for to impose the harshest of punishments on an
intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent dignity
as a human being. “[P]unishment is justified under one or more of
three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribu-
tion.” Rehabilitation, it is evident, is not an applicable rationale
for the death penalty. As for deterrence, those with intellectual
disability are, by reason of their condition, likely unable to make
the calculated judgments that are the premise for the deterrence
rationale. They have a “diminished ability” to “process informa-
tion, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or
to control impulses . . . [which] make[s] it less likely that they
can process the information of the possibility of execution as a
penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
information.” Retributive values are also ill-served by executing
those with intellectual disability. The diminished capacity of the
intellectually disabled lessens moral culpability and hence the
retributive value of the punishment.121
Since then, the Supreme Court has explained that “States have some flexibility,
but not ‘unfettered discretion,’” in enforcing Atkins.122 As a result, states vary in how
they address defendants in this category.123 The functioning definition of intellectual
disability has three parts: (1) “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning”; (2)
“deficits in adaptive functioning (the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior
to changing circumstances)”; and (3) “onset of these deficits during the developmental
period.”124 While a defendant must prove the existence of all three factors, the Court
recently made clear in Moore v. Texas that a court’s determination of whether a defen-
dant is intellectually disabled should be informed by the medical community, and
courts should not overemphasize any of these factors to the detriment of another.125
Although the prevalence of intellectual disability in capital defendants is unclear
for several reasons,126 it is clear that the constitutional bar to executing intellectually
121 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992–93 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
122 Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052–53 (2017) (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998);
see U.S. CONST. amend. X.
123 See, e.g., Disparities in Determinations of Intellectual Disability, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2015), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6040 [https://perma.cc/PWE3
-X3GC] (listing various success rates across states for defendants raising intellectual disability
claims); Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty, supra note 118.
124 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.
125 Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050.
126 These reasons likely include the number of defendants who are intellectually disabled
and do not raise an Atkins-related claim, as well as the seemingly high rate of unsuccessful
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disabled defendants further narrowed the pool of eligibility for the death penalty.127 It
is also clear that society has embraced this standard, as states continue to introduce and
pass legislation restricting the execution of defendants with intellectual disabilities.128
2. Juveniles
Next, the Supreme Court has narrowed the pool of eligibility for death with
respect to juveniles. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court explained that
“less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable
crime committed by an adult” based on the “obvious” reasons of “[i]nexperience,
less education, and less intelligence,” which make the juvenile “less able to evaluate
the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much
more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.”129 In
other words, the Court explained that a juvenile’s “irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult” for the same “reasons . . . juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult.”130
As with changes related to mental capacity, the Court followed the states’ lead
in making changes to capital sentencing regarding juveniles. When Thompson was
decided, the Court explained that state laws fell into three categories: (1) fourteen
states did not authorize capital punishment at all, (2) nineteen states authorized
capital punishment without setting a “minimum age . . . in the death penalty statute,”131
and (3) the remaining states authorized capital sentencing and “expressly established
a minimum age in their death penalty statutes,” which “require[d] that the defendant
have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense.”132 The Court
found that the current state laws, which defined a “juvenile” as a defendant who “ha[d]
attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense,”133 represented current
societal standards.134 Thus, the Court held that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the execution of” juveniles, or persons “under 16 years of age at the time
of [the] offense.”135
claims. See John H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual
Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of a
Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 396–98 (2014) (explaining filing and
success rates since Atkins).
127 See Ian Freckelton, Offenders with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: Sen-
tencing Challenges After the Abolition of Execution in the United States, 23 PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCHOL. & L. 321, 332 (2016).
128 Recent Legislative Activity, supra note 100.
129 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 826–27; see BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMP-
TION 115 (2014) (explaining that Alabama had a high rate of juveniles sentenced to death).
132 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 830.
135 Id. at 838.
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Several years after Thompson, again reviewing state laws from around the coun-
try in Roper v. Simmons, the Court extended that the meaning of “juvenile” in this
context includes defendants who committed the crime between sixteen and eighteen
years of age.136 In Roper, the defendant was seventeen when he “committed murder”
but turned eighteen “[a]bout nine months later.”137 Under Thompson, because he was
seventeen at the time of the crime, the defendant “was outside the criminal jurisdic-
tion of [his state’s] juvenile court system.”138 As a result, “[h]e was tried as an adult,”
convicted, and “the trial judge imposed the death penalty.”139
Determining that society’s standards of decency had evolved to determine “that the
death penalty is [a] disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18,”140 the Su-
preme Court determined that Roper’s sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s judgment setting aside his
sentence of death. Thus, the Court in Roper broadened the definition of juvenile, as
used in the capital sentencing context, and further narrowed the pool of eligibility
for the death penalty.141
One may argue that capital punishment maintains full support when imposed
against an offender of sufficient mental capacity. However, as the next Section
explains—using Florida as an example—comparing the way in which defendants
were sentenced to death just after Furman and the process by which defendants are
sentenced to death today suggests that the “evolving standards of decency” has also
narrowed other aspects of the death penalty since Furman.142
B. How Defendants Are Sentenced to Death
In a matter of fifty years, the requirements for sentencing a defendant to death
in Florida have transformed from nearly nothing to comprehensive, mandating a jury’s
unanimous determination on every fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,
including the final recommendation for death.143 Unlike the changes related to who
136 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
137 Id. at 556.
138 Id. at 557.
139 Id. at 557–58.
140 Id. at 575.
141 See id. at 578–79.
142 It is important to note that Alabama is an exception here. As of January 2020, Alabama
is the only state in the country that does not statutorily require a jury’s unanimous recommenda-
tion for death before a defendant may be sentenced to death.
143 See Fla. Stat. § 921.141 (2019). Florida’s current statute is consistent with the Supreme
Court of Florida’s decision in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
2161 (2017). However, during the editing process of this Article, in January 2020, the Supreme
Court of Florida receded from Hurst. In State v. Poole, 2020 WL 370302 (Fla. 2020), the
Court held that the jury’s unanimous recommendation for death is not required to meet the
constitutional mandates of the Sixth Amendment. Despite Poole, Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme has not changed, and the news has reported that Florida’s Legislature does not intend
to revise the statute in light of Poole. See, e.g., News Service of Florida, Florida Senate
2020] STEPS TOWARD ABOLISHING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 605
may be sentenced to death, which were based on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, these changes—relating to the capital sentencing
process—are generally based on the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to trial
by jury144 because the choice to sentence a defendant to death starts with the jury.
The jury recommends to the trial court that the defendant be sentenced to death, and
the trial judge then imposes the final sentence.145
Before Furman, death was a mandatory punishment once a defendant was
convicted of certain capital crimes.146 Upon conviction, the trial court automatically
imposed a sentence of death without any further findings.147 After Furman, which
held that capital sentencing statutes needed “safeguards sufficient to ensure that the
penalty would be applied reliably and not arbitrarily,”148 states including Florida
reenacted capital sentencing schemes that aimed to make the process more selective
and, therefore, less arbitrary.149
Under Florida’s post-Furman legislation, only “offenders who commit ‘a narrow
category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the
most deserving of execution’” were eligible for death.150 As mentioned above, Florida’s
new statute delineated “aggravating circumstances” and “mitigating circumstances,”
which the jury was to weigh in making its ultimate sentencing recommendation.151
Under Florida’s post-Furman statute, capital defendants could be sentenced to death
upon the following findings: (a) a majority of the twelve-member jury (seven mem-
bers) voted to recommend a sentence of death; and (b) the judge determined that (i)
the aggravation outweighed the mitigation, and (ii) death was appropriate.152
However, just because the jury made these findings did not guarantee a defen-
dant would be sentenced to death. The jury and trial court always had the option to
Won’t Consider Death Penalty Changes in 2020 Session, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-ne-nsf-senate-death-penalty-20200130-lgbf27
6sj5ay5clctnuknju4cq-story.html [https://perma.cc/V84P-H4JH]. If that changes and the Legis-
lature amends Florida’s capital sentencing statute in light of Poole, Florida will join Alabama
as an outlier in capital sentencing. However, that would not change the argument herein that con-
stitutional standards related to capital sentencing have contributed to the incremental approach
toward abolition.
144 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VIII. See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);
Melanie Kalmanson, Distinguishing Proper Procedure of Improper Punishment (Apr. 1, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
145 See, e.g., 1973 Fla. Laws 20–21 (showing how Florida had the jury make a recommenda-
tion on the death sentence to the judge).
146 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286–87 (1976).
147 See id.
148 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149 See, e.g., Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
2929 (1977).
150 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 319 (2002)).
151 1973 Fla. Laws 21–22.
152 See id. at 20–21.
606 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:587
exercise mercy and sentence the defendant to life.153 Upon review, the Supreme
Court of Florida held that this new statute satisfied the constitutional mandates of
Furman.154 Thus, Florida continued with capital sentencing, executing fifty-one
defendants between 1976 and June 2002,155 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Ring v. Arizona.156
In Ring, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that capital defendants are entitled to
a jury determination that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each factor
necessary to impose a sentence of death.157 Since Ring, several states have abolished
capital punishment.158 Most states that retained capital punishment after Ring enacted
statutes requiring a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death before the trial court
could impose a sentence of death.159 Other states, including Florida, determined that
Ring did not compromise the validity of their existing statute and made no changes
to their capital sentencing scheme in light of Ring.160
Florida maintained its capital sentencing scheme under which a twelve-member
jury could recommend death by a mere majority and the trial court made findings
on aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances after the jury recommended
153 Mercy is a juror’s ability to—despite having found that all of the elements for capital
punishment have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the Sixth and Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution—determine that death, for any other reason, is not an
appropriate sentence. See, e.g., id. at 21 (stating if the court did not sentence death, then they
were to sentence life imprisonment).
154 State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1950 (1974).
155 Execution List: 1976–Present, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us
/ci/execlist.html [https://perma.cc/F3M9-KFY3] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [hereinafter
Execution List].
156 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
157 Id. at 589; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000). Courts look to state
statutes to determine what the necessary facts are. See generally Ring, 536 U.S. 583.
158 See States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/A7CW-RUHF] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2020). Specifically: Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey,
New Mexico, and New York have abolished the death penalty since Ring. Id. In addition,
four states—Colorado, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Oregon—have imposed gubernatorial
moratoria since Ring. Id. After Hurst, Delaware also abolished the death penalty. State by State,
supra note 101. Also, since 2018, as explained above, even more states have made these
changes. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
159 See State Developments, Post-Ring, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpen
altyinfo.org/state-developments-post-ring [https://perma.cc/MS9N-RY28] (last visited Feb. 24,
2020); Supreme Court Declares Defendants Have a Right to Jury Determination of Eligi-
bility for Death Sentence, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/us-su
preme-court-ring-v-arizona [https://perma.cc/B8XB-GJUZ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
160 See, e.g., Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662
(2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002) (stating that Ring does not effect the Florida
death penalty as the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld its constitutionality several times), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002).
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death.161 In some cases, trial courts even imposed sentences of death when the jury
did not recommend death—referred to as a judicial override.162 Notwithstanding,
capital defendants continuously and unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality
of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in light of Ring.163
Fourteen years after Ring, in Hurst v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court finally
reviewed the constitutionality of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in light of
Ring.164 Vindicating the argument that capital defendants had raised for years, the
Supreme Court determined that Ring applied to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme,165
and violated the Sixth Amendment by failing to require the jury “to find each fact
necessary to impose a sentence of death.”166 The Court made clear that “[a] jury’s
mere recommendation [for death] is” insufficient to protect capital defendants’ con-
stitutional right to a trial by jury,167 explaining:
Although Florida incorporates an advisory jury verdict that
Arizona lacked, we have previously made clear that this distinc-
tion is immaterial: “It is true that in Florida the jury recommends
a sentence, but it does not make specific factual findings with re-
gard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge. A
Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s findings
of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge
in Arizona.”168
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declared that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme
was unconstitutional and remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for “further
proceedings.”169
161 See State Developments, Post-Ring, supra note 159 (discussing Florida’s retention of
a judge determined death penalty system).
162 See, e.g., Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 377 (Fla. 2004); see also Asay v. State, 210
So. 3d 1, 29 (Fla. 2016) (Labarga, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017).
163 See, e.g., Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 673–74 (Fla. 2004); Patton, 878 So. 2d at
377; Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 48–49 (Fla. 2003); Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 694–95; King,
831 So. 2d at 144–45; see also Gaskin v. State, 218 So. 3d 399, 402, 404 (Fla. 2017)
(Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 620–21 (2016).
165 Id. at 622.
166 Id. at 619.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 622 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)). Likewise, the Supreme
Court overruled its former decisions in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), and Hildwin
v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989). “[T]o the extent they allow a sentencing judge to find an ag-
gravating circumstance, independent of a jury’s factfinding, that is necessary for imposition
of the death penalty.” Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624.
169 Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624.
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On remand in Hurst, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that Hurst v.
Florida, in conjunction with the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
provisions of the Florida Constitution, “requires that all the critical findings neces-
sary before the trial court may consider imposing a sentence of death must be found
unanimously by the jury.”170 Further, “based on Florida’s requirement for unanimity
in jury verdicts, and under the Eighth Amendment,” the Supreme Court of Florida
held “that in order for the trial court to impose a sentence of death, the jury’s rec-
ommended sentence of death must be unanimous.”171 Quite similar to how the U.S.
Supreme Court relied on state legislation in making changes to Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court looked to other state legislation for guidance, noting:
The vast majority of capital sentencing laws enacted in this
country provide the clearest and most reliable evidence that
contemporary values demand a defendant not be put to death ex-
cept upon the unanimous consent of the jurors who have deliber-
ated upon all the evidence of aggravating factors and mitigating
circumstances.172
After Hurst, the Florida legislature enacted a new capital sentencing statute,
essentially codifying the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Hurst. This new statute
required the jury to unanimously make each of the necessary findings identified in
Florida’s capital sentencing statute, including the final recommendation. By adopt-
ing this new statute, Florida joined “[t]he vast majority of” other states that still
employ capital punishment.173
After Florida amended its capital sentencing statute post-Hurst, Delaware and
Alabama were the only states that did not require unanimity in the jury’s final
recommendation for death.174 Since Hurst v. Florida, the Delaware Supreme Court
170 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). Based
on Florida’s specific statute, the Court explained: “In capital cases in Florida, these specific
findings required to be made by the jury include the existence of each aggravating factor that
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the finding that the aggravating factors are suf-
ficient, and the finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances.”
Id. As explained in note 143, supra, although the Supreme Court of Florida has receded from
Hurst, the statute that resulted from Hurst remains the controlling sentencing statute in Florida.
For more on changes in the Supreme Court of Florida’s jurisprudence since Hurst and poten-
tial forthcoming changes, see generally Melanie Kalmanson, Storm of the Decade: The Aftermath
of Hurst v. Florida & Why the Storm Is Likely to Continue, U. MIAMI L. REV. CAVEAT (2020).
171 Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 44.
172 Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
173 Id. Again, it is unclear whether Florida will rejoin Alabama or not after the Supreme Court
of Florida’s decision in Poole. Regardless, the overarching argument here regarding incremental-
ism in the death penalty, which led to Hurst in the first place, remains. See supra note 143.
174 Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 72 (Pariente, J., concurring).
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has determined that Delaware’s capital sentencing scheme, like Florida’s, also vio-
lated the U.S. Constitution.175 Unlike Florida, however, the Delaware Supreme Court
determined that all sentences of death imposed under the unconstitutional statute
would be reduced to sentences of life imprisonment without parole.176 The Delaware
legislature has not reenacted the death penalty, leaving Delaware without a mecha-
nism to impose capital sentences.177 Thus, Alabama, which requires that only ten of
twelve jurors vote for a sentence of death,178 is now the only state in the United
States that does not require a jury’s unanimous recommendation before a trial judge
may impose a sentence of death.
As the evolution of capital sentencing in Florida shows, states—as a result of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s developing jurisprudence—have gradually narrowed capital
punishment via the sentencing process. In Florida, the capital sentencing process has
developed from one in which the State needed merely seven jurors’ recommenda-
tions for death—a bare majority of the twelve-member jury—to one in which the State
must convince each of twelve jurors that:
(1) each aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt,
(2) the aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable doubt
are sufficient for a sentence of death,
(3) the aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable doubt
outweigh the mitigation, and
(4) death is an appropriate punishment.179
Naturally, these changes have caused and will further cause a decrease in the number
of sentences of death imposed in Florida.180
175 Rauf v. Delaware, 145 A.3d 430, 433–34 (Del. 2016).
176 See generally id.; Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpen
altyinfo.org/methods-execution [https://perma.cc/8DXU-EJXQ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
177 See Rauf, 145 A.3d at 433–34.
178 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f) (1981); see, e.g., Clark v. Dunn, No. 16-0454-WS-C, 2018
WL 264393, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 2, 2018).
179 Of course, under this new scheme, jury overrides are unconstitutional. Also, between the
jury’s third and fourth finding in the capital sentencing process is the concept of mercy. As the
Supreme Court of Florida explained in Hurst, “[I]t [is] the finding by the jury of all the ele-
ments necessary for conviction of murder that subject[s] the defendant to the ultimate penalty,
unless mercy [is] expressed in the verdict of the jury as allowed by law.” 202 So. 3d at 56.
Thus, under a system in which the jury must unanimously vote to recommend death, any juror
can “save” the defendant from death for any reason by voting to recommend a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole instead of death; the juror’s reason for doing so must not be
explained. Id. at 57–58.
180 See, e.g., Laura C. Morel, Far Fewer Florida Killers Are Sentenced to Die After Courts
Require Unanimous Juries, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com
/news/courts/criminal/Far-fewer-Florida-killers-are-sentenced-to-die-after-courts-require
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The final way in which courts have refined the death penalty since the pre-Furman
Wild, Wild West is how defendants are executed. Again, society—or the “evolving
standards of decency”—motivated these changes, which are explained below.
C. How Defendants Are Executed
Historically, challenges to execution methods brought to the U.S. Supreme
Court under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment
have been unsuccessful.181 “Our society has nonetheless steadily moved to more
humane methods of carrying out capital punishment.”182 Specifically, society has
proxied the development from “[t]he firing squad, hanging, the electric chair, and
the gas chamber” to “today’s consensus on lethal injection.”183
One of the original methods of execution was the firing squad.184 When this
method was used, the inmate was “bound to a chair with leather straps across his
waist and head, in front of an oval-shaped canvas wall. The chair [was] surrounded
by sandbags to absorb the inmate’s blood.”185 Hooded, the inmate’s heart was pinned
with “a circular white cloth target.”186 Twenty feet away, five shooters “armed with
.30 caliber rifles loaded with single rounds” except one, who was “given blank rounds,”
aimed “his rifle through a slot in the canvas and fire[d] at the inmate.”187
In 1878, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the firing squad did not violate the
Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.188 Three execu-
tions have been completed via firing squad since 1976, all of which occurred in Utah.189
-unanimous-juries_167160363 [https://perma.cc/MVX8-87VG]; Jake Stofan, Number of Crimi-
nals Sentenced to Death in Florida Declining, WJHG (Apr. 13, 2018, 6:34PM), https://www
.wjhg.com/content/news/Number-of-criminals-sentenced-to-death-in-Florida-declining-479
733503.html [https://perma.cc/235F-5CCT].
181 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62 (2008).
182 Id.
183 Id. (citation omitted); accord STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 13 (“[T]he gallows . . .
were replaced with other, more technically complex modes of execution. . . . The replacement
of the gallows with other, purportedly more humane execution methods was the fourth wave
of death penalty reform, and it is still continuing today.”).
184 Deborah W. Denno, The Firing Squad as “A Known and Available Alternative Method
of Execution” Post-Glossip, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 778 (2016).
185 Firing Squad, DEATH PENALTY CURRICULUM, https://deathpenaltycurriculum.org/student
/c/about/methods/firingsquad.htm [https://perma.cc/NE32-8SPZ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
186 Id.
187 Id.; Cruel and Unusual, MORE PERFECT (June 2, 2016), https://www.wnycstudios.org
/story/cruel-and-unusual [https://perma.cc/BNR7-C4UH] (describing the work of Reprieve, a
legal organization working on death penalty cases, to limit access to drugs used for execution).
188 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134–35 (1878).
189 Denno, supra note 184, at 788; Methods of Execution, supra note 176; see Von Drehle,
supra note 12 (showing the number of executions by method since 1700, of which 130 were
due to firing squad). If you include the number of executions before 1976, “American firing
squads have executed 144 inmates.” Denno, supra note 184, at 778.
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The most recent was Ronnie Lee Gardner in 2010.190 Today, three states—Mississippi,
Oklahoma, and Utah—allow execution by firing squad if lethal injection becomes
unconstitutional or unavailable; and, in Utah, defendants sentenced after May 3,
2004, may choose firing squad over lethal injection.191 There have been no botched
executions by firing squad since 1976.192 However, “[o]nly Utah ever fully embraced
the firing squad, so a national consensus on it never formed.”193
Hanging was the primary method of execution until the 1890s.194 It “was once
used in almost every state and territory.”195 Under this method, the defendant’s “hands
and legs are secured, he or she is blindfolded, and the noose is placed around the neck,
with the knot behind the left ear. The execution takes place when a trap-door is
opened and the [defendant] falls through.”196 As the defendant falls, the defendant’s
weight “cause[s] a rapid fracture-dislocation of the neck.”197 Three executions have
been completed via hanging since 1976,198 the last of which was in January 1996 in
Delaware.199 Today, one state—New Hampshire—allows execution by hanging if it is
the only constitutional or available method.200 The overall rate of botched executions
190 Alexander Vey, No Clean Hands in a Dirty Business: Firing Squads and the Euphemism
of “Evolving Standards of Decency,” 69 VAND. L. REV. 545, 574 (2016).
191 Denno, supra note 184, at 781–82 (citations omitted); Methods of Execution, supra
note 176.
192 Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execu
tions/botched-executions [https://perma.cc/S6VU-YMBJ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020); see
Denno, supra note 184, at 753–54 (explaining that the firing squad guarantees a “certain death”);
see also Denno, supra note 184, at 791 (“In Justice Sotomayor’s words, it is ‘more reliable’
as well as ‘relatively quick and painless.’” (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2796
(2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting))); Vey, supra note 190, at 575 (“[T]his process has been
remarkably difficult to botch.”). However, there were a couple botched executions by firing
squad before 1976. See Denno, supra note 184, at 787; Vey, supra note 190, at 575.
193 Vey, supra note 190, at 576.
194 Hanging, DEATH PENALTY CURRICULUM, https://deathpenaltycurriculum.org/student
/c/about/methods/hanging.htm [https://perma.cc/3HDK-5JG6] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
195 Vey, supra note 190, at 564.
196 Hanging, supra note 194.
197 Id.; accord Vey, supra note 190, at 563–64 (describing another hanging process).
198 Methods of Execution, supra note 176; see Von Drehle, supra note 12 (showing the
number of executions by method since 1700, of which, 9,183 were due to hanging).
199 Hanging, supra note 194.
200 See Methods of Execution, supra note 176; see also Mark Berman, Washington Supreme
Court Strikes Down States Death Penalty, Saying It Is “Arbitrary and Racially Biased,” WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/10/11
/washington-supreme-court-strikes-down-states-death-penalty-saying-it-is -arbitrary-and-ra
cially-biased/ [https://perma.cc/C24F-2WFN]. While Delaware and Washington allow execu-
tion by hanging on the books, both states’ supreme courts have ruled capital punishment
generally unconstitutional. Id.; see also Erik Eckholm, Delaware Supreme Court Rules State’s
Death Penalty Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
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by hanging is 3.12%.201 “Near the end of the nineteenth century, botched hangings,
combined with changing public sensibilities,” or evolving standards of decency,
“turned American public opinion against the use of hanging.”202
In 1924, Nevada introduced the use of lethal gas in executions.203 Under this
method, the defendant “is strapped to a chair in an airtight chamber. Below the chair
rests a pail of sulfuric acid.”204 Once the execution team has left the chamber, “the
room is sealed. The warden then gives a signal to the executioner who . . . releases
crystals of sodium cyanide into the pail,” which causes a “chemical reaction that
releases hydrogen cyanide gas.”205 Once the defendant dies, “an exhaust fan sucks
the poison air out of the chamber” so the execution team may enter.206
“In 1970, lethal gas was the second most widely used method of execution, fol-
lowing the electric chair.”207 At that time, “lethal gas was the sole method of execu-
tion” in ten states.208 States using lethal gas for execution used one of several gases,
including nitrogen and cyanide, to “cause hypoxia, an oxygen deficiency that causes
death.”209 Eleven executions have been completed via lethal gas since 1976,210 the
last of which occurred in 1999.211 Today, seven states—Alabama, Arizona, California,
Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Wyoming—allow execution by lethal gas, four
of which—Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Wyoming—allow it only if lethal
injection is deemed unconstitutional or becomes otherwise unavailable.212 Indeed,
“after failing to obtain lethal injection drugs”213 in March 2018, “Oklahoma . . . de-
cided to use inert gas inhalation as the primary method for death penalty executions.”214
/08/03/us/delaware-supreme-court-rules-states-death-penalty-unconstitutional.html [https://
nyti.ms/2aLHeKf].
201 Botched Executions, supra note 192.
202 Vey, supra note 190, at 564.
203 Gas Chamber, DEATH PENALTY CURRICULUM, https://deathpenaltycurriculum.org/stu
dent/c/about/methods/gaschamber.htm [https://perma.cc/T3KS-5LAS] (last visited Feb. 24,
2020).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
208 Id.
209 Nicole Chavez, Texas ‘Ice Pick Killer’ Executed with Lethal Injection Wanted a Firing
Squad or Gas Death, CNN (June 29, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/texas-danny
-bible-execution/index.html [https://perma.cc/NQC6-JT9U]; see Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1396.
210 Methods of Execution, supra note 176; see Von Drehle, supra note 12 (showing the
number of executions by method since 1700, of which fifty-nine are due to gas).
211 Gas Chamber, supra note 203.
212 Methods of Execution, supra note 176.
213 Timothy Williams, Oklahoma Turns to Gas for Executions Amid Turmoil over Lethal
Injection, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/us/oklahoma-ni
trogen-executions.html [https://nyti.ms/2GuKMxG].
214 Chavez, supra note 209.
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However, “[t]he gas chamber is widely viewed as an antiquated mode of execution,
causing a slow, painful, and inhumane death.”215 In fact, some courts have indicated
that execution by lethal gas, at least as employed by some states, is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment.216 The overall rate of botched executions by lethal gas
is 5.4%.217
By 1994, states started moving “away from use of the gas chamber as a means
of execution.”218 Between lethal gas and the current method of lethal injection, states
used electrocution (known as the “electric chair”) as the primary method of execu-
tion.219 “New York built the first electric chair in 1888.”220 Under this method, the
defendant “is usually shaved and strapped to a chair with belts that cross” the defen-
dant’s “chest, groin, legs, and arms. A metal skullcap-shaped electrode is attached
to the scalp and forehead over a sponge moistened with saline.”221 Blindfolded, the
defendant is given “[a] jolt of between 500 and 2000 volts. . . . This process continues
until the prisoner is dead.”222
Electrocution is responsible for the highest number of modern executions223—
161 executions since 1976224—and arguably the worst botched executions.225 Despite
the horror of botched executions by electrocution, the overall rate of botched
executions by electrocution is fairly low at 1.92%.226 Today, nine states—Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia—allow execution by electrocution.227 “The supreme courts of Georgia
(2001) and Nebraska (2008) have ruled that the use of the electric chair violates their
state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.”228 In
addition, justices on the Supreme Court of Florida argued in 1999, based on infor-
mation from several botched executions, that execution by electrocution was
215 Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1407 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
216 See LaGrand v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999); Fierro v. Gomez, 77
F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir. 1996).
217 Botched Executions, supra note 192.
218 Fierro, 865 F. Supp. at 1405.
219 See, e.g., Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 437 (Fla. 1999).
220 Electrocution, DEATH PENALTY CURRICULUM, https://deathpenaltycurriculum.org/stu
dent/c/about/methods/electrocution.htm [https://perma.cc/V4SS-FJM8] (last visited Feb. 24,
2020); accord Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, PBS, https://www.pbs.org
/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/execution/readings/history.html [https://perma.cc/G3BC-VPLF].
221 Electrocution, supra note 220.
222 Id.
223 Botched Executions, supra note 192.
224 Methods of Execution, supra note 176; see Von Drehle, supra note 12 (showing the
number of executions by method since 1700, of which 4,439 are due to electrocution).
225 See Vey, supra note 190, at 566.
226 Botched Executions, supra note 192.
227 Methods of Execution, supra note 176; see also STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 16.
228 Methods of Execution, supra note 176.
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unconstitutional.229 “When the Supreme Court agreed to hear an Eighth Amendment
challenge to Florida’s use of electrocution, the governor called a special session of
the Florida legislature to craft a lethal injection protocol, cutting off the challenge.”230
States then transitioned from electrocution to lethal injection, which remains the
primary method of execution across the country.231
Texas became the first state to use lethal injection in 1982.232 Florida adopted
lethal injection as the primary method of execution in 2000.233 By 2008, the federal
government and “[t]hirty-six States that sanction[ed] capital punishment ha[d]
adopted lethal injection as the preferred method of execution.”234 At that time, most
states and the federal government used the following three-drug protocol: (1) an
anesthetic, usually sodium thiopental; (2) a paralytic agent, pancuronium bromide;
and (3) potassium chloride, in varying amounts, which “stops the heart and causes
death.”235 Until 2009, most states still used this protocol.236 Based on information
that the second and third drugs cause pain, the first drug is critical in ensuring that
the lethal injection process does not violate the Eighth Amendment.237
After 2009, due to difficulty in accessing drugs, states started finding other options
for the first drug.238 In 2010, states began using pentobarbital as the first drug.239
Oklahoma was the first to use pentobarbital in an execution; since then, thirteen
other states have used pentobarbital in executions.240 In addition, eight states have
used midazolam as the first drug, the first of which was Florida in 2013.241
229 See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 431, 435 (Fla. 1999) (Shaw, J., dissenting);
id. at 450–51 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
230 Vey, supra note 190, at 566.
231 See, e.g., Provenzano, 744 So. 2d at 450 (Pariente, J., dissenting); Methods of Execu-
tion, supra note 176.
232 See State by State Lethal Injection Protocols, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/lethal-injection/state-by-state-lethal-injection-protocols
[https://perma.cc/QF88-YC55] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020); see also Cruel and Unusual, supra
note 187 (discussing the history and invention of the lethal injection execution method).
233 See Schwab v. State, 973 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 2007) (Pariente, J., concurring).
234 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008).
235 Id. at 73; Overview of Lethal Injection Protocols, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/lethal-injection/overview-of-lethal-injection-protocols [https://
perma.cc/YV27-AK7A] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
236 State by State Lethal Injection Protocols, supra note 232.
237 See, e.g., Schwab, 973 So. 2d at 429 (Pariente, J., concurring) (“[I]f the inmate is not
fully unconscious before pancuronium bromide is administered there is a high probability
that an inmate will suffer unnecessary pain.”); see also Cruel and Unusual, supra note 187
(discussing the history and invention of the lethal injection execution method).
238 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 15–16; Cruel and Unusual, supra note 187
(discussing the shortage of certain drugs used in lethal injection protocols).
239 State by State Lethal Injection Protocols, supra note 232.
240 Id.
241 Id.
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In 2017, Florida became the first state to use etomidate as the first drug in its
lethal injection protocol.242 The “pharmacology of etomidate is described by the drug
insert as follows”:
Etomidate is a hypnotic drug without analgesic activity. Intrave-
nous injection of etomidate produces hypnosis characterized by
a rapid onset of action, usually within one minute. Duration of
hypnosis is dose dependent but relatively brief, usually three to
five minutes when an average dose of 0.3mg/kg is employed.243
“The most frequent adverse reactions associated with use of intravenous etomidate
are transient venous pain on injection and transient skeletal movements, including
myoclonus,”244 which is a “sudden, involuntary jerking of a muscle or group of
muscles.”245 The first defendant executed in Florida after this change, Mark Asay,
challenged Florida’s new protocol shortly before his execution.246 Denying this
claim, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that Asay neither “demonstrated
that he [was] at substantial risk of serious harm” nor identified “a known and
available alternative method of execution that entails a significantly less severe risk
of pain.”247
Other states have moved to a one-drug protocol, in which the defendant is in-
jected with only “a lethal dose of an anesthetic.”248 Some argue that the one-drug
protocol is favorable to the three-drug protocol for various reasons.249 Ohio became
the first state to implement a one-drug method in 2009, using sodium thiopental.250
242 Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 703 (Fla. 2017); Tracy Connor, Florida Executes Mark
James Asay with Experimental Injection, NBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nbcnews
.com/storyline/lethal-injection/florida-plans-execute-mark-james-asay-experimental-in
jection-n795531 [https://perma.cc/3CRV-4KLZ].
243 Asay, 224 So. 3d at 701.
244 Id. (quoting what is stated on the “drug insert”).
245 Myclonus Fact Sheet, NAT’L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKE, https://www
.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/Patient-Caregiver-Education/Fact-Sheets/Myoclonus-Fact-Sheet
[https://perma.cc/WYU6-QB6M] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
246 Asay, 224 So. 3d at 699.
247 Id. at 701–02.
248 Overview of Lethal Injection Protocols, supra note 235.
249 See, e.g., Schwab v. State, 973 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 2007) (Pariente, J., concurring);
Paul Lewis, Report Urges One-Drug Lethal Injection to Avoid Botched US Executions, GUAR-
DIAN (May 7, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/oklahoma-lethal-in
jection-execution-drugs-constitution-animals [https://perma.cc/CF9F-83F3]; Josh Sanburn,
Creator of Lethal Injection Method: “I Don’t See Anything that is More Humane,” TIME
(May 15, 2014), http://time.com/101143/lethal-injection-creator-jay-chapman-botched-execu
tions/ [https://perma.cc/K9FH-FX2H].
250 State by State Lethal Injection Protocols, supra note 232.
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Since then, seven other states have adopted one-drug protocols, while six other
states have “announced plans to use a one-drug protocol, but have not carried out
such an execution.”251
Despite the general consensus that lethal injection is the most humane method
of execution to date, it is not unheard of for defendants to request other methods of
execution, or for defendants to suffer pain during execution by lethal injection.252 In
fact, the Death Penalty Information Center reports that lethal injection has the highest
rate of botched executions across the several methods—7.12%.253
Even in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s insistence that the Eighth Amendment
does not protect defendants from a pain-free execution—most recently in Bucklew
v. Precythe—the evolution of how defendants are executed in the United States
indicates that anti–death penalty actors have been incrementally successful in shift-
ing laws toward the most humane way to maintain capital punishment.254 This process
“is still continuing today.”255 Society remains the driving force behind this evolu-
tion, as the Eighth Amendment standard suggests. As one author explained:
[T]hese evolving standards are, like the rest of the Bill of Rights,
intended to protect people, and not merely society, from govern-
ment, safeguarding the individual from imposition of cruelty by
the state. In this way, “standards of decency” are properly con-
sidered as the bounds of what the state may acceptably impose
on our fellow human beings. Such concerns are particularly im-
portant for death row inmates, who are “among the most de-
spised members of any community,” and thus lack access to the
protections of the political process. Regardless of their crimes,
they remain human beings, protected by the Constitution, which
is sometimes forgotten when discussing the death penalty.256
As the developments in the method of execution reveal, and Part IV further explains,
the “evolving standards of decency” standard, rather than destabilizing the death
penalty as the Steikers argue, actually created a coherent vehicle by which courts
can ultimately reach abolition.
251 Overview of Lethal Injection Protocols, supra note 235.
252 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 15; see also, e.g., Richard Gonzales,
Tennessee Death Row Inmates Request Death by Firing Squad, NPR (Nov. 5, 2018), https://
www.npr.org/2018/11/05/664548834/tennessee-death-row-inmates-request-death-by-firing
-squad [https://perma.cc/RHR2-EWAT].
253 Botched Executions, supra note 192; accord STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 15.
254 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
255 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 13; accord id. at 16.
256 Vey, supra note 190, at 553–54 (footnotes omitted).
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IV. DEFINING THE ROUTE FROM HERE TO ABOLITION VIA THE
“EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY”
As explained and illustrated above, the controlling “evolving standards of
decency” standard for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has produced an incremental
decrease in capital punishment since the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in Furman. While other authors contend that the Court’s jurisprudence since Furman
has frustrated the path to abolition, or created new reasons for abolition based on the
system’s failure to satisfy the demands set forth in Furman,257 this Article contends
that the “evolving standards of decency” framework is a vehicle by which the sys-
tem will reach abolition. The framework, by inducing incremental changes in capital
sentencing, will continue to inject uncertainty into capital sentencing as society
continues to develop—ultimately leading to abolition.
Not only is this incremental process inherent in the guiding “evolving standards
of decency” framework, it is practically more realistic. Eliminating a much nar-
rower, confined capital punishment, of which society understands the limitations,
is more achievable in a system of constrained courts that seek to avoid radical out-
comes—especially the current U.S. Supreme Court.258 In other words, it is much
more likely that societal support—which this Article has shown is necessary for the
Court to justify a change under the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of
decency” standard—for eliminating capital sentencing will exist when the pool of
eligibility has been sufficiently narrowed. Such sufficient narrowing is, of course,
the natural result of incrementalism “encourag[ing] small changes within existing
institutional and jurisdictional shapes”259 rather than a system in which any defen-
dant convicted of a serious crime could be sentenced to death at the trial court’s
whim, as in the pre-Furman Wild, Wild West.
This Part explains why abolition is likely the end point for capital sentencing as
a result of the “evolving standards of decency” framework and, more importantly,
defines probable next steps in the incremental process to reaching abolition.
257 See, e.g., Sarat et al., supra note 11.
258 See, e.g., Courtney C. Alonzo, The Strategic Justice: The Judicial Philosophy of Chief
Justice John Roberts, EREPOSITORY SETON HALL U. 1, 2 (2015), https://scholarship.shu.edu
/student_scholarship/819/ [https://perma.cc/YX5F-MZDB]; Robert Barnes, Roberts Empha-
sizes High Court’s Restraint, Independence, WASH. POST (May 7, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/chief-justice-says-independence-and-restraint-should-be
-high-courts-guiding-lights/2016/05/07/c42fdf5c-139d-11e6-8967-7ac733c56f12_story.html
[https://perma.cc/UZ4E-TW7P]; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30, Bucklew v.
Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (No. 17-8151), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF
/17/17-8151/39073/20180315165447252_BucklewIFPPete-file.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H3F
-R8ME] (using to its advantage the narrowness of the as-applied appeal to urge the Court to
rule on the merits).
259 SCOTT H. AINSWORTH & THAD E. HALL, ABORTION POLITICS IN CONGRESS: STRATEGIC
INCREMENTALISM AND POLICY CHANGE 34 (2011).
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A. Why Abolition Is the Final Destination
Before discussing how incrementalism will likely lead to abolition, it is impor-
tant to establish why abolition, rather than a refined system of regulation, is the
ultimate end point. Of course, multiple factors will affect the successful abolition of
capital punishment.
For years, Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have expressed their views that
capital sentencing no longer comports with the Eighth Amendment.260 Most notably,
dissenting in Glossip v. Gross in 2015, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
explained how “changes that have occurred during the past four decades. . . . lead
[him] to believe that the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a legally
prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’”261 Breyer stated that evidence shows
that the death penalty is not only unreliable but arbitrarily imposed and unnecessar-
ily delayed, despite the Court’s best efforts in Furman.262
Similarly, while not united on the path toward abolition, scholars seem united
on the sentiment that abolition is the ultimate resting place for capital sentencing.263
Most of the arguments supporting abolition present moral264 and pragmatic265 ration-
ales.266 While liberals generally rely on the former, conservatives have recognized
260 See Von Drehle, supra note 12.
261 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
262 Id.
263 See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 5; John D. Bessler, The Abolitionist Movement
Comes of Age: From Capital Punishment as a Lawful Sanction to a Peremptory, International
Law Norm Barring Executions, 79 MONT. L. REV. 7, 13 (2018) (“[T]here is now a global infra-
structure to fight capital punishment.”).
264 The moral-based arguments for abolition are intuitive. By definition, the death penalty
is irreversible. Similarly, some argue that there is no humane way to kill defendants, especially
considering the prevalence of botched executions that remains today. Further, evidence suggests
that the death penalty provides neither any deterrent effect nor finality to victims’ families
who arguably have the greatest interest in seeing that the defendant receive the most extreme
punishment. See, e.g., STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 3; Innocence, NAT’L COALITION
TO ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/pages/innocence [https://perma.cc
/24JU-HG2S] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020).
265 Pragmatically, the death penalty is “slow, costly and uncertain.” Von Drehle, supra
note 12; see David J. Burge, Death Penalty Too Costly, Inefficient, AJC (May 7, 2015), https://
www.myajc.com/news/opinion/death-penalty-too-costly-inefficient/WqTj0pDjQzmnOikkPu
VkHO/?ecmp=ajc_social_twitter_2014_sfp#bd9c24e5.3828699.735725 [https://perma.cc
/YTB8-F3X4] (“[T]he appeals and clemency process in death penalty cases takes considerable
time, effort and expense.”). As a result of the extended appellate process, capital defendants often
spend decades on death row awaiting execution. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 1. In fact,
the Steikers report that execution is only the third leading cause of death to death row defendants.
Id. Likewise, capital punishment is expensive. See id. at 1–2; Von Drehle, supra note 12.
266 See Mark Berman, After Florida Prosecutor Says She Won’t Seek Death Penalty, Gov-
ernor Reassigns Case of Slain Police Officer, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/16/after-florida-prosecutor-says-she-wont-seek
-death-penalty-governor-reassigns-case-of-slain-police-officer [https://perma.cc/8AHZ-DTNC];
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the latter for supporting arguments against retaining capital punishment.267 Also, one
author writes that arguments supporting abolition have, in recent years, shifted from
morality to practicality.268
One key element in justifying abolition, which is inherent to the “evolving stan-
dards of decency” standard, is societal support. Society’s progression toward rejecting
capital punishment altogether is critical; currently, the law—having developed in-
crementally to this point—would support the change. Indeed, while some may dispute
whether abolition is the endpoint or whether incrementalism will lead to such result,269
it seems clear that abolition is where society and, therefore, the courts are headed.
In fact, this progression is already evident.270 A 2017 Gallup poll reported a
“trend toward diminished death penalty support as many states have issued moratoria
on executions or abolished capital punishment.”271 Specifically, the report showed
that support for the death penalty had fallen “to a level not seen in 45 years”—the
lowest since 1972, the year Furman was decided.272 Only 55% of Americans sup-
ported the death penalty for convicted murders in October 2017,273 down 5% from
October 2016.274 Between 1994, when support for capital punishment peaked at
80%, and 2016, support for the death penalty dropped 20%.275 In November 2019,
support for the death penalty reached an all-time low with a majority of Americans
Five Reasons to Abolish the Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L (May 8, 2019), https://www.am
nesty.org.au/5-reasons-abolish-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/ST2N-48R4]; Frances Robles
& Alan Blinder, Florida Prosecutor Takes a Bold Stand Against Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/us/orlando-prosecutor-will-no-longer
-seek-death-penalty.html [https://nyti.ms/2m7axgQ]; Why the Death Penalty Should Be Abol-
ished, INT’L COMM. AGAINST DEATH PENALTY, http://www.icomdp.org/arguments-against
-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/GEQ7-MLDF]; see also, e.g., Sean McElwee, It’s Time
to Abolish the Death Penalty, HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/en
try/abolish-death-penalty_b_3557782.html [https://perma.cc/EQ5J-Y6R3].
267 See, e.g., Burge, supra note 265.
268 Sarat et al., supra note 11, at 760.
269 See AINSWORTH & HALL, supra note 259, at 34 (“Achieving a nonincremental goal may
require thinking big, and incrementalism typically encourages the opposite.”); cf. ZIEGLER,
supra note 72, at 59.
270 See STEVENSON, supra note 131, at 249 (“In many states, the number of exonerations
exceeded the number of executions . . . .”).
271 Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP (Oct. 26,
2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/221030/death-penalty-support-lowest-1972.aspx [https://
perma.cc/TBN5-ANEQ].
272 Id.; see J. Baxter Oliphant, Support for Death Penalty Lowest in More than Four Dec-
ades, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/29
/support-for-death-penalty-lowest-in-more-than-four-decades/ [https://perma.cc/G45H-UYZU];
see also Public Opinion, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and
-research/public-opinion-polls [https://perma.cc/3R72-FZAR] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
273 Jones, supra note 271.
274 See id.
275 See id.
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saying “life imprisonment is a better approach for punishing murder than . . . the
death penalty.”276
In addition to American society, evidence suggests that the global trend is toward
abolition.277 Amnesty International reports that 106 countries—a “majority of the
world’s states”—have abolished capital sentencing.278 Even more striking, “the
United States is . . . the only Western democracy that still retains the death pen-
alty.”279 Not only that, but presently, the United States is “one of the top five
executioners in the world, along with China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.”280 Thus,
some would argue that the United States, by retaining the death penalty, is behind
global standards on human rights.281 Indeed, several scholars argue that international
human rights provides the foundation for abolition.282 However, considering the
United States’ hesitancy to accept international human rights standards in other con-
texts,283 it seems unlikely that it will be keen on protecting the international human
rights of convicted murderers.
When society rejects capital punishment, the courts will come to meet society.
Of course the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court affects when and how change
will occur, and each Justice’s vote plays a critical role in the outcome and reasoning
of each opinion.284 Likewise, recent changes in the Court may frustrate any progress
toward abolition.285 However, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained, when the
276 Gallup Poll, supra note 13.
277 See Five Reasons to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 266.
278 Id.
279 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 22.
280 Id.
281 Several scholars advance the argument that international human rights is the path to
abolishing capital sentencing; however, it is much more likely that federal courts will adopt
a new rule under the U.S. Constitution than under international human rights standards. See
generally Melanie Kalmanson, Note, Filling the Gap of Domestic Violence Protection: Return-
ing Human Rights to U.S. Victims, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1359 (2016) (explaining in another
context the courts’ hesitancy to adopt new rules based on international standards).
282 See, e.g., Bessler, supra note 263, at 19–20.
283 See, e.g., Kalmanson, supra note 281 (discussing the United States’s reluctance to
adopt international standards in cases concerning domestic violence protection).
284 See, e.g., HIRSHMAN, supra note 41, at 75–76 (explaining how each Justice’s vote
changed the outcome of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and how the composition of the
Supreme Court affected the result of Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
285 See Adam Liptak, Confirming Kavanaugh: A Triumph for Conservatives, but a Blow
to the Court’s Image, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/poli
tics/conservative-supreme-court-kavanaugh.html [https://nyti.ms/2RuSzRi]. But see, e.g., Adam
Liptak, Kavanaugh May Hold Key Vote in His First Death Penalty Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/us/politics/supreme-court-death-penalty-kavanaugh
.html [https://nyti.ms/2yUqdbw] (suggesting that Kavanaugh may not vote with conservatives
on some death penalty issues).
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pendulum of American politics swings too far one way, it seems to eventually swing
back the other way.286
Considering how instrumental each Justice’s vote becomes in creating new law,
stare decisis is also critical in developing jurisprudence that supports—almost
requires—abolishing capital sentencing. As with the racial and gender equality
movements, the need for stare decisis comports with the incremental approach. Each
incremental decision toward the goal helps create a jurisprudential foundation upon
which the Court may ultimately rely in determining that the law compels abolition, at
the correct time. In other words, once the law is sufficiently developed, skeptical Jus-
tices will feel almost bound by, or at least secure in, precedent to make the move to abo-
lition rather than undoing all of the precedent implementing the incremental changes.
Thus, each incremental change induced by the “evolving standards of decency”
standard becomes a building block in the foundation that will ultimately uphold, or
require, abolition. Once the law has sufficiently narrowed capital sentencing to the
absolute “worst of the worst,” the ultimate decision to abolish capital sentencing will
be much less shocking and more acceptable to society and the courts. To that end,
the next Subsection explains additional incremental changes that can be made to
further move the law toward building the foundation for abolition.
B. Next Incremental Steps
Similar to the incremental changes we have already seen, the next steps in the
incremental approach to abolishing capital punishment will likely relate to: (1)
which defendants are eligible for death; (2) which defendants are actually sentenced
to death; and (3) the execution process.
1. Defendants Eligible for Death
The first way in which the U.S. capital punishment system may be further
narrowed through the “evolving standards of decency” standard is by continuing to
limit the defendants who are eligible for the death penalty. One way this may occur
is by expanding the definition of “juvenile” based on new science.
The process of garnering courts’ acceptance of this argument has already started
in the courts. For example, in his last appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida before
his February 22, 2018, execution,287 Eric Branch, who was twenty-three years old
286 See ‘Pendulum’ Will Swing Back, Says Supreme Court Judge, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-39065541/pendulum-will-swing-back-says-su
preme-court-judge [https://perma.cc/4G8E-J6HC] (“Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
says the U.S. is ‘not experiencing the best of times’—but the ‘pendulum’ will spring back.”).
287 Eric Branch Yells ‘Murderers!’ During His Execution for Killing College Student in
1993, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 22, 2018), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-florida
-execution-eric-scott-branch-0222-story.html [https://perma.cc/H626-DUAX].
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at the time of his crimes,288 “argue[d] for an expansion of” the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Roper v. Simmons “on the basis that newly discovered evidence—in the
form of scientific research with respect to development of the human brain, as well
as the evolution of state and international law—mandates that individuals who
committed murder in their late teens and early twenties be treated like juveniles.”289
Branch argued that this new science supports a finding that some individuals’ brains
do not fully develop until their early twenties.290 The Supreme Court of Florida
denied the claim, stating, in pertinent part: “unless the United States Supreme Court
determines that the age of ineligibility for the death penalty should be extended, we
will continue to adhere to Roper.”291
Later in 2018, Florida death row defendant, Kevin Foster, who was eighteen at
the time of his crime,292 also raised this issue. Foster argued, in pertinent part, that
his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under the “evolving standards
of decency,” based on a new “consensus within the scientific community regarding
the development of the adolescent brain and cognitive functioning.”293 Regarding
the new science, Foster’s brief to the Supreme Court of Florida explained:
Evidence as to the general consensus now existing throughout
the scientific community regarding the cognitive development
of the adolescent brain in youths aged 18–21 constitutes newly
discovered evidence based upon new scientific information and
data that was not part of any previously existing compilation.
. . . Scientific advances can give rise to newly discovered
evidence claims predicated upon new advancements in testing
methods or technologies that did not exist at the time of trial, but
were later used to test evidence introduced at the original trial.
The flaws inherent in the science used to assess cognitive devel-
opment and its impact on an 18–21-year-old defendant’s decision-
making processes were not fully developed and/or acknowledged
at the time of Mr. Foster’s trial or during his evidentiary hearing
in postconviction. Mr. Foster’s claim here is premised upon the
recognition of the general consensus within the scientific com-
munity regarding the development of the adolescent brain and
the manner in which that consensus has influenced and shaped
288 See Juliana Rose Pignataro, Who Is Eric Scott Branch? Florida to Execute Man Con-
victed of College Student’s 1993 Rape, Murder, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 22, 2018), http://www.news
week.com/florida-execute-eric-branch-murder-816514 [https://perma.cc/6L8Q-8K92].
289 Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 985 (Fla. 2018).
290 Id.
291 Id. at 987.
292 Brief of Appellant at 22, Foster v. State, 235 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 2018) (No. SC18-860).
293 Id. at 7, 22–23.
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courts’ determination as to the applicability of the death sentence
to defendants under 21 years old under the Eighth Amendment’s
“evolving standards of decency.” Mr. Foster’s evidence regarding
the emerging science of adolescent brain development, consid-
ered along with all of the evidence introduced in his case, both
at trial and in postconviction, establishes that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the application of the death penalty in his case.294
Finally, referring to this new science as evidence of evolution in the standards of
decency, Foster argued:
Evolving standards of decency today counsel that adoles-
cents aged 18–21 years old do not possess the requisite culpability
to be sentenced to death. Newly developed science in the field
of adolescent brain development establishes that emerging ado-
lescents—those who are in their late teens and early twenties—are
more comparable to juveniles than adults who possess fully
developed brains.295
In essence, Foster argued that new science indicates that a person may be “juvenile,”
as the concept is understood under the law, until twenty-one years old. Acknowledg-
ing that the Florida Supreme Court indicated in Branch its adherence to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s direction on this issue and recognizing that the U.S. Supreme
Court still had not yet addressed this issue, Foster nevertheless argued that the court
had the authority to grant relief on this theory.296
The Supreme Court of Florida did not address this issue. But it is likely only a
matter of time until the U.S. Supreme Court hears this issue. If the Court accepts this
new science as proof, or views this new science as evidence of society’s understand-
ing that at least some persons do not reach the capacity of an adult until later than
eighteen years old, the “evolving standards of decency” framework would compel
the Court to shift the line drawn in Roper, thereby narrowing the pool of eligibility
for death. Specifically, under Branch’s argument, the definition of juvenile would
move from eighteen to twenty-one, thereby adding those who are between eighteen
and twenty-one years old at the time of their crimes and can prove diminished cul-
pability to the list of defendants excluded from capital sentencing. In other words,
there would no longer be a strict cutoff at the defendant’s eighteenth birthday.
Rather, the defendant—who was between the age of eighteen and twenty-one at the
time of the crime—would have the opportunity to show that he or she should not be
eligible for the death penalty based on diminished culpability.
294 Id. at 24–25 (internal citations omitted).
295 Id. at 26.
296 Id. at 26–27.
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This change would be significant because statistics indicate that a significant
portion of capital offenders are young at the time of their crimes. For example,
79.8% of murder/manslaughter defendants in Florida were between seventeen and
fifty years of age at the time of the offense.297 The majority—56.5%—of the offend-
ers in that category were between the age of twenty and twenty-nine at the time of
their offenses.298 Therefore, this new definition of juvenile, if adopted by the courts,
would noticeably limit the pool of persons eligible for death.299 As a result, society’s
acceptance of the death penalty would decline.
2. Defendants Sentenced to Death
Second, it is likely that fewer defendants, of those who are eligible for death,
will actually be sentenced to death. As explained above, Alabama is currently the
only state in the country that does not statutorily require a jury’s unanimous require-
ment for death.300
Naturally, with states requiring unanimity in the jury’s final recommendation
for death, states will impose fewer sentences of death because it is more difficult to
obtain twelve votes for death than it is to obtain seven or even ten votes.301 In fact,
out of Florida’s almost 400 death row inmates in January 2016, when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida, only 17.5% were sentenced to death after
a jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death.302 Florida has already seen
a decrease in death sentences since it required unanimity in the jury’s final recom-
mendation for death.303
This difficulty in obtaining unanimous jury recommendations indicates that
society’s acceptance of the death penalty is lower than otherwise suggested when
states did not require unanimity. The unanimity requirement will likely force some
jurors to reconsider their recommendations in the sentencing phase because their one
vote for life could mean the difference for the defendant—a situation that occurred
much less frequently before the unanimity requirement. Likewise, as Florida
continues to see the effects of this change, society’s acceptance of the death penalty
is likely to continue to decline—again steering the guiding framework toward
abolition. As society begins to disfavor capital punishment more, obtaining unani-
mous jury recommendations for death will become even more difficult.
297 Melanie Kalmanson, The Difference of One Vote or One Day: Reviewing the Demo-
graphics of Florida’s Death Row After Hurst v. Florida, 74 MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 12 & tbl.1).
298 Id. (manuscript at 26–27).
299 See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 26).
300 After Poole, Florida does not constitutionally require unanimity. As explained above,
it remains to be seen whether Florida will amend its capital sentencing statute.
301 See Stofan, supra note 180.
302 Kalmanson, supra note 281, at 27.
303 See, e.g., Stofan, supra note 180.
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Thus, juries—as a function of society—play a large role in driving societal sup-
port for capital sentencing. The fewer death sentences juries impose, the more likely
societal support is to decrease. In other words, courts and society seem to steer each
other in making incremental changes.
3. Execution Process
Finally, the aspect of capital sentencing that seems to be the most unrefined is
the actual execution process. Starting with the drugs used in lethal injection and
ending with the specific time of execution, this Section explains aspects of the ex-
ecution process that can be changed to better protect defendants’ rights and narrow
capital punishment even after sentencing.
a. Drugs Used in Lethal Injection
First, as to the drugs used in lethal injection, some judges have expressed their
belief that these drugs cause pain that amounts to “cruel and unusual punishment”
under the Eighth Amendment. For example, in 2015, Justice Sotomayor—joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan—dissented in Glossip v. Gross, arguing that
“rocuronium bromide and potassium chloride,” which Oklahoma used in its lethal
injection protocol and were “intended to paralyze the inmate and stop his heart,”
respectively, are torturous because they “caus[e] burning, searing pain.”304 Sotomayor
also found that the petitioners had “presented ample evidence showing that the State’s
planned use of [midazolam] pose[d] substantial, constitutionally intolerable risks.”305
Likewise, the dissenting judges on the Supreme Court of Florida considered a
similar issue. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Florida denied Mark Asay’s request for
discovery to attempt to prove his claim that Florida’s revised lethal injection
protocol—which replaced midazolam with etomidate—violated the Eighth Amend-
ment because it “create[d] a substantial risk of harm” to defendants.306 At that time,
“etomidate ha[d] never been used in a lethal injection anywhere in the United States.”307
Justice Barbara J. Pariente dissented, arguing that Asay should have been granted
access to the requested documents in light of the real concern that etomidate would
cause unnecessary harm to defendants during executions.308 Based on these con-
cerns, courts could further limit the drugs that states use in lethal injection.
Even assuming that states maintain the ability to use the drugs currently imple-
mented in lethal injection, states have faced difficulty in accessing these drugs for
years. Drug manufacturers started objecting to the use of their products “to kill
304 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2780–81 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
305 Id. at 2781.
306 Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 705 (Fla. 2017) (Pariente, J., dissenting).
307 Id.
308 Id. at 707–08. Several defendants since Asay have unsuccessfully raised similar concerns.
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people.”309 Thus, it is almost certain that states will continue having trouble accessing
lethal injection drugs. Indeed, some anti–death penalty activists aim to continuously
reduce states’ access to lethal injection drugs.310 As a result, two things could happen:
(1) an increase in defendants claiming that the state is using expired drugs, as has
already started in some states,311 and (2) more states instituting one-drug protocols.
First, it is likely that, with restricted access to execution drugs, states’ supply of
lethal injection drugs will start to expire. “Drug manufacturers are required by law
to put an expiration date on drugs in the United States, and after that date they
cannot guarantee the drug’s effectiveness or safety,”312 which, of course, is crucial
for the state complying with the Eighth Amendment when conducting executions.
Indeed, in 2017, Arkansas scheduled seven executions in a period of eleven days
to beat the expiration of its drug supply.313 “Officials blame[d] the packed April
execution schedule on the drug shortage,” which caused states to “scrambl[e] for
replacement chemicals and, in some cases, has caused them to contemplate other
methods of execution.”314 In 2017, South Carolina also had an execution scheduled
for which it did not have a sufficient supply of drugs because the drugs were either
expired or unavailable.315
Likewise, defendants have started raising claims that their execution will violate
the Eighth Amendment because the state is likely to use expired drugs. For example,
in his last appeal before his execution, Florida death row inmate, Eric Branch,
argued that it was likely the state would use expired drugs in his execution.316 The
309 Mark Berman, With Lethal Injection Drugs Expiring, Arkansas Plans Unprecedented
Seven Executions in 11 Days, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/07/with-lethal-injection-drugs-expiring-arkansas-plans-un
precedented-seven-executions-in-11-days/?utm_term=.236aee3af076 [https://perma.cc/PE96
-A5GU]; see, e.g., Madison Park & Tina Burnside, South Carolina Lacks the Lethal Injection
Drugs Needed to Execute Inmate, CNN (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/22
/us/south-carolina-execution-drugs/index.html [https://perma.cc/GD3J-VJRC]; see also Jolie
McCullough, Will Texas Have to Push Back the Expiration Dates on Its Lethal Injection
Drugs?, TEX. TRIB. (May 17, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/05/17/texas-lethal-in
jection-drugs-are-set-expire-upcoming-executions/ [https://perma.cc/4FU8-8Z3P].
310 See Cruel and Unusual, supra note 187 (describing the work of Reprieve, a legal orga-
nization working on death penalty cases, to limit access to drugs used for execution).
311 See, e.g., Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 985 (Fla. 2018) (explaining that the defen-
dant argued “that the [department of correction’s] supply of execution drugs may be expired”);
Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 511–12 (Fla. 2017).
312 Berman, supra note 309.
313 Id.; accord Astrid Galvan, Arizona Faces Drug-Expiration Deadline for Executions,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/arizona-faces
-drug-expiration-deadline-for-executions/ [https://perma.cc/4KTB-2U22] (explaining that
Arizona’s supply of the execution drug midazolam might expire before a lawsuit suspending
all execution in the state is decided).
314 Berman, supra note 309.
315 Park & Burnside, supra note 309.
316 Branch, 236 So. 3d at 984.
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problem with these claims is that the state, specifically the department of corrections,
is afforded a great amount of deference when a defendant challenges the execution
protocol, or the state’s ability to follow the protocol.317 Likewise, defendants are of-
tentimes denied access to records that would assist them in proving these claims.318
Also as a result of restricted access to lethal injection drugs, states may begin
instituting one-drug protocols to lessen the number of drugs they must obtain to
conduct executions. However, even then, states will likely face difficulty in access-
ing drugs necessary to conduct executions.
b. Sick Inmates
Second, courts are likely to eventually bar states from, or at least limit states in,
executing ill inmates.319 Florida’s execution protocol, for example, indicates that
states are at least aware of the dangers posed in executing ill inmates, as the protocol
requires the execution team to review the inmate’s medical file and “determine
whether there are any medical issues that could potentially interfere with the proper
administration of the lethal injection process.”320
Despite this recognition, states are experiencing botched executions, specifically
those of ill inmates.321 The increasing age of the death row population likely contrib-
utes to this issue.322 According to data from the Justice Department, “12.2 percent
of death-row inmates were 60 or older” in 2013, up from 5.8% in 2007.323
317 See, e.g., id. at 985 (“[T]his Court has stated that it will presume ‘the DOC will act in
accordance with its protocol and carry out its duties properly. This same presumption would
extend to presume that the DOC will obtain viable versions of the drugs it intends to use and con-
firm before use that the drugs are still viable, as the protocol requires.’” (quoting Muhammad
v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 206 (Fla. 2013))); Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 512 (Fla. 2017).
318 See Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 700 (Fla. 2017) (denying records sought to prove
claim of harm in Florida’s new lethal injection protocol); see also Branch, 236 So. 3d at 985;
Hannon, 228 So. 3d at 512.
319 Cf. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 15 (“[I]t can be difficult for nonprofessionals
to maintain adequate sedation . . . [for] inmates whose veins may be compromised by drug
use, old age, or poor health”).
320 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTION BY LETHAL INJECTION PROCEDURES (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/FloridaProtocol01.04
.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RUK-U3XR].
321 See, e.g., Sandee LaMotte, Death Row Inmate Sues After ‘Botched’ Execution, CNN
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/07/health/alabama-execution-lawsuit/index.html
[https://perma.cc/UL86-3S4R] (covering botched execution of Doyle Lee Hamm in Alabama).
322 See Mark Berman, Alabama Executes Walter Moody, the Oldest Inmate Put to Death
in the Modern Era, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/post-nation/wp/2018/04/19/he-was-convicted-of-bombing-a-federal-judge-now-alabama
-plans-to-make-him-the-oldest-inmate-executed-in-modern-history/?utm_term=.cbd
f4cc6875d [https://perma.cc/K92U-3VPP] (“[A]ging produces certain issues that complicate
executions, including health problems.”).
323 Id.
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For example, in early 2018, the execution of Doyle Lee Hamm in Alabama was
called off after the execution team unsuccessfully attempted for hours to insert the
IV necessary for lethal injection.324 Members of the execution team reportedly
“stuck Hamm repeatedly in the lower legs, ankles and groin before the state called
off the procedure.”325 Before the execution, Hamm and his attorneys “had argued for
months that” using lethal injection on Hamm would amount to cruel and unusual
punishment because “Hamm’s veins had become severely compromised by lym-
phatic cancer and ‘years of intravenous drug use.’”326 Hamm instead requested that
the lethal drugs be orally injected.327 Hamm’s attorney explained the after effects of
the botched execution, stating that “the IV personnel almost certainly punctured
Doyle’s bladder, because he was urinating blood for the next day. They may have
hit his femoral artery as well, because suddenly there was a lot of blood gushing
out.”328 In addition, Hamm had “pain going from the lower abdomen to the upper
thigh” and was “limping badly . . . and terribly sore.”329
Russell Bucklew was scheduled to be executed in Missouri on March 20, 2018.
Just before his scheduled execution, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
denied Bucklew’s federal action arguing “that execution by Missouri’s lethal injection
protocol . . . would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to him because of his unique medical
condition.”330 The Eighth Circuit explained Bucklew’s medical condition as follows:
Bucklew has long suffered from a congenital condition called
cavernous hemangioma, which causes clumps of weak, mal-
formed blood vessels and tumors to grow in his face, head, neck,
and throat. The large, inoperable tumors fill with blood, periodi-
cally rupture, and partially obstruct his airway. In addition, the
condition affects his circulatory system, and he has compromised
peripheral veins in his hands and arms.331
As a result of his medical condition, Bucklew argued, with supporting evidence,
that it would be impossible for the state “to execute him without substantial risk of
324 See LaMotte, supra note 321; Chandrika Narayan, Alabama’s Aborted Execution Was
‘Botched and Bloody,’ Lawyer Says, CNN (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/27
/us/alabama-aborted-execution/index.html [https://perma.cc/UAD8-EYLN]; see also Botched
Executions, supra note 192.
325 Narayan, supra note 324.
326 Id.; see Botched Executions, supra note 192.
327 Narayan, supra note 324.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Bucklew v. Precythe, 883 F.3d 1087, 1089–90 (8th Cir. 2018).
331 Id. at 1090.
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severe pain and needless suffering.”332 Determining that Bucklew failed to establish
both prongs of the Glossip/Baze standard, the Eighth Circuit denied Bucklew’s claim.333
Bucklew filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. On
the day of his scheduled execution, the Court granted Bucklew’s application for a
stay of execution.334 After holding oral argument in November 2018,335 the Supreme
Court issued a decison affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision.336
Considering Bucklew’s plead for a stay as a delay tactic,337 the Supreme Court held
that “the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner a painless death.”338 Rather,
the Supreme Court explained, the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and
unusual punishment only “come[s] into play” when “the risk of pain associated with
the State’s method is ‘substantial when compared to a known and available alterna-
tive.’”339 Thus, because Bucklew failed to provide a “feasible and readily implemented
alternative to the State’s chosen method” and “failed to present any evidence suggesting
that [any viable alternative] would significantly reduce his risk of pain” the Court
denied Bucklew relief.340 Shortly after the Court’s decision, the state of Missouri
rescheduled Bucklew’s execution. Bucklew was executed on October 1, 2019.341
In June 2018, Texas defendant Danny Paul Bible “asked authorities to carry out
his execution using gas or a firing squad.”342 Sixty-six at the time of his execution,
Bible “appealed all the way up to the Supreme Court, arguing that he was ‘very
weak and sick’ and that his veins were not capable of sustaining the infusion of
lethal injection drugs, making them likely to ‘blow.’”343 His attorneys argued that
“the likelihood of a botched execution was very high due to [Bible’s] declining
health, adding that he would suffer serious pain.”344 After his claims were denied,
332 Id. at 1091.
333 Id. at 1097.
334 Bucklew v. Precythe, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/buck
lew-v-precythe/ [https://perma.cc/USF6-Q372] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
335 Id.
336 Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
337 See Melanie Kalmanson, Somewhere Between Death Row and Death Watch: The Pro-
cedural Trap Capital Defendants Face in Raising Execution-Related Claims, U. PA. J.L. &
PUB. AFFAIRS (forthcoming 2020). See generally Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. 1112.
338 139 S. Ct. at 1124.
339 Id. at 1125 (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2735 (2015)).
340 Id. at 1133.
341 Holly Yan & Steve Almasy, Missouri Inmate Executed Despite Activists’ Concerns He
Could Suffer Because of His Rare Disease, CNN (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019
/10/01/us/missouri-execution-russell-bucklew-rare-disease-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc
/2BRD-C56W].
342 Chavez, supra note 209.
343 Id. There have been instances in which the execution team has had trouble finding the
inmate’s veins to enter the IV necessary for lethal injection—oftentimes caused by the de-
fendant’s former intravenous drug use. See Botched Executions, supra note 192.
344 Chavez, supra note 209.
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Bible was executed by lethal injection.345 Witnesses reported that, “[a]fter receiving
the lethal injection, Bible breathed heavily for about two minutes, shaking from
Parkinson’s tremors as he muttered ‘it hurts.’”346
Based on cases like Hamm’s, Bucklew’s, and Bible’s, a rule precluding the exe-
cution of ill inmates seems likely. While these defendants were not granted relief,
there are strong suggestions that their execution caused pain and, therefore, threat-
ened an Eighth Amendment violation.347 While these cases were likely still too early
for any change, especially considering the recent changes on the Court, it is likely
that one of the next steps in the incremental approach to abolition is for courts to
bar, or at least restrict, the execution of inmates whose illness could cause them to
suffer severe pain during execution.
Having discussed how the pool of eligibility and execution process may be
refined, the next two discussions turn to discuss how the waiting periods on death
row that most defendants face, which likely constitute Eighth Amendment viola-
tions, are another aspect of capital punishment that could be refined as part of the
incremental approach to abolition.
c. Length of Time on Death Row
Before execution, defendants spend years, sometimes decades, on death row,
oftentimes enduring multiple appeals.348 This delay between sentencing and execu-
tion can usually be explained by one or both of the following: (1) the length of the
appellate process, which was explained earlier, and (2) executive discretion in
selecting defendants for execution. As to the latter, the process by which states
select death row inmates for execution is anything but uniform.349 “The relative few
who are killed continue to be selected by a mostly random cull.”350 Regardless of the
reason, it is possible that courts will eventually adopt the view that a defendant spend-
ing an extended period of time on death row awaiting execution amounts to an
Eighth Amendment violation.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 See id.; Narayan, supra note 324.
348 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 1, at 1; see, e.g., Execution List, supra note 155; see
also Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 988 (Fla. 2018); Johnson v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 27 (Fla.
2010); Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 437 (Fla. 1998).
349 Even in Florida, where the state legislature enacted a statute to ensure the uniform and
systemic processing of death sentences through execution, defendants have no way of knowing
or predicting when their execution will be scheduled. See, e.g., Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d
505, 509 (Fla. 2017); Bolin v. State, 184 So. 3d 492, 502 (Fla. 2015); Mann v. State, 112 So.
3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013); Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 362, 366 (Fla. 2012); Gore v. State,
91 So. 3d 769, 780 (Fla. 2012). Rather, the governor has “absolute discretion” in choosing
inmates for execution and scheduling the selected inmate’s execution. Gore, 91 So. 3d at 780.
350 Von Drehle, supra note 12.
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Defendants have argued for years that the length of time they spend on death row
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.351 While this
argument has been unsuccessful, several judges have expressed their agreement with
this claim. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Breyer, dissenting in Glossip v. Gross, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, explained that “[t]he problems of reliability and unfairness” in cap-
ital punishment “almost inevitably lead to” the “independent constitutional problem”
of “excessively long periods of time that individuals typically spend on death row,
alive by under sentence of death.”352 He wrote that “unless we abandon the proce-
dural requirements that assure fairness and reliability” in capital sentencing, “we are
forced to confront the problem of increasingly length delays in capital cases,” which he
calculated to be “an additional 37.5 years” on death row “before being executed.”353
Justice Breyer argued that this delay is unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) “it ‘sub-
jects death row inmates to decades of especially severe, dehumanizing conditions
of confinement’” and (2) it “undermines the death penalty’s penological rationale.”354
As to the former, which is most pertinent here, Justice Breyer explained that this
uncertainty manifests in several forms—prolonged delay of execution, revocation
of warrants, etc.355 He explained that “it is well documented that . . . prolonged
solitary confinement produces numerous deterious harms,” which is then exacer-
bated by “uncertainty as to whether a death sentence will in fact be carried out.”356
Justice Breyer noted that the Court recognized in 1890 in In re Medley that “when
a prisoner sentenced by a court to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the
execution of the sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be
subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it.”357
Likewise, in his 2013 book, former Justice Wells of the Supreme Court of
Florida wrote that he “did a great deal of research into the specifics of the processing
of individual death-penalty cases” because he “wanted to understand why those cases
took so long from trial to being finally adjudicated.”358 He writes that he was “very
concerned about the length of time these inmates were maintained on death row,
which is a special and very limiting type of confinement,” and agreed with “Breyer’s
dissenting opinion in Ellege v. Florida stating that such confinement for years,
because of its length and unique pressures, could become cruel and unusual punish-
ment.”359 Indeed, in the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Knight v. State, Justice
Wells wrote:
351 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
352 Id.
353 Id. at 2764–65.
354 Id. at 2765 (citation omitted).
355 See id. at 2766–67 (citing numerous works discussing these constitutional concerns).
356 Id. at 2765.
357 Id. at 135 S. Ct. at 2766 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890)); see STEVEN-
SON, supra note 131, at 244.
358 CHARLEY WELLS, INSIDE BUSH V. GORE 10 (2013).
359 Id. (citation omitted).
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While I agree that the length of time Knight has been on death
row does not create a constitutional impediment to his execution,
I do again state my view that such an extended time period to
finally adjudicate these cases is totally unacceptable and is this
Court’s and the State’s prime responsibility to correct[.] The mur-
ders in this case were committed in July 1974; Knight was con-
victed of the murders in April 1975. The courts and the State
must be able to do better, and any explanation of why we are un-
able to do so is insufficient.360
Justice Wells explained that he “thought the state had an obligation to have the
inmate’s case processed within a reasonable period of time so that the inmate would
either be executed or removed from that type of confinement.”361
Upon determining that the length of time some defendants spend on death row
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, courts could reduce the extended period
of time defendants spend awaiting execution in two ways. First, as Justice Wells
suggested, the Court could designate a period of time that amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment, at which point the defendant’s sentence is commuted to life to
minimize any further harm.362 For example, a court could hold that a defendant
awaiting execution on death row for thirty-five years or more amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment. Under this new rule, defendants’ sentences of death would be
commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole once thirty-five
years passed since the defendant’s sentencing.
Second, courts could determine that once a defendant’s guaranteed appeals are
completed or waived, the governor must schedule the defendant’s execution within
a finite period of time.363 While the absence of a system for selecting defendants for
execution could be seen as a benefit to defendants—an expansion of life by delaying
execution—it is clear that the absence of any warning or information as to when one
will be executed causes severe mental anguish.364 Such psychological harm likely
outweighs any benefit of a theoretically delayed execution.
Even past the appellate process and selection for execution, there is a final
portion that courts could find amounts to cruel and unconstitutional punishment, as
discussed below.
360 Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 439–40 (Fla. 1998) (Wells, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
361 WELLS, supra note 358, at 10.
362 Id.
363 In fact, some states, such as Florida, have enacted statutes that provide these guidelines.
But it is clear that these statutes are not followed. For a deeper discussion on the warrant
process, see generally Kalmanson, supra note 337.
364 See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890); STEVENSON, supra note 131, at 244.
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d. Delayed Executions
Finally, courts could find that the time between the defendant’s scheduled and
actual execution, which is often hours,365 amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
For example, Governor Scott of Florida on September 1, 2017, signed a warrant
scheduling Cary Michael Lambrix’s execution for October 5, 2017, at 6:00 PM.366 As
a result of the short warrant period, Lambrix still had several petitions—seeking the
Court’s review of the Supreme Court of Florida’s denial of relief—and applications
for a stay of execution pending at the U.S. Supreme Court, on the day of execution.367
Some of Lambrix’s petitions had been filed days before the scheduled execution.368
Likely because of the number of petitions pending and the short period of time the
U.S. Supreme Court had to review the material, the cases remained pending at 6:00 PM,
when Lambrix’s execution was scheduled.369 Ultimately, Lambrix was not executed
until 10:10 PM—over four hours after his execution was originally scheduled.370
Similarly, the execution of William Rayford in Texas on January 30, 2018, was
delayed for more than two hours “while the U.S. Supreme Court considered . . . last-
day appeals from Rayford’s lawyers.”371 The actual execution process took only
thirteen minutes.372
More recently, eighty-five-year-old Walter Leroy Moody, Jr., who was the oldest
inmate to be executed in modern times, waited over two hours before his execution
began in Alabama on April 19, 2018.373 Moody’s execution was scheduled for 6:00 PM,
365 See generally Kalmanson, supra note 337.
366 Lambrix v. Jones, 227 So. 3d 550, 551–52 (Fla. 2017).
367 See No. 17-5539, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename
=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-5539.html [https://perma.cc/8JE4-QJ9Y]; No. 17-6202,
SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html
/public/17-6202.html [https://perma.cc/HC8A-YBYY]; No. 17-6290, SUP. CT. U.S., https://
www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html /public/17-6290.html
[https://perma.cc/EL4T-GD89].
368 No. 17-6202, supra note 367.
369 Id.
370 Associated Press, Florida Executes Man Convicted of Double Murder, WCTV (Oct. 5,
2017), http://www.wctv.tv/content/news/Lambrix-to-be-executed-Thursday-449322703.html
[https://perma.cc/E3CT-HXC2]. Also in Florida, the execution of Patrick Hannon was delayed
almost three hours after the scheduled time. See Josh Solomon, Victim’s Relative Waves Good-
bye as Patrick Hannon Executed, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.tampabay
.com/news/publicsafety/crime/victim-s-relative-waves-goodbye-as-Patrick-Hannon-execu
ted_162451581/ [https://perma.cc/ZW76-7WGP].
371 Texas Executes Dallas Man for Ex-Girlfriend’s 1999 Slaying, CBS NEWS (Jan. 31,
2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-execution-william-rayford-killing-ex-girlfriend
-dallas/ [https://perma.cc/5YP5-UENU]; accord Texas Executes William Rayford, DEATH
PENALTY NEWS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://deathpenaltynews.blogspot.com/2018/01/texas-exe
cutes-william-rayford.html [https://perma.cc/E4YG-P27J].
372 Texas Executes Dallas Man for Ex-Girlfriend’s 1999 Slaying, supra note 371.
373 Berman, supra note 322.
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but the U.S. Supreme Court issued a temporary stay around 5:45 PM.374 When
Moody’s “appeals finally came to a[n] . . . end”375 with the U.S. Supreme Court deny-
ing relief, the execution began at 8:16 PM.376 Moody was pronounced dead at 8:42
PM—almost three hours after his scheduled execution.377
These executions make clear that the uncertainty as to one’s death that Justice
Breyer discussed in Glossip extends until the moment of execution, exacerbating the
psychological harm and torture suffered by the defendant. One could argue that just
the anguish of waiting for hours awaiting one’s death alone serves the penological
purpose of the death penalty—requiring one to confront and contemplate his or her
own death as a result of his or her crimes. Of course, the lack of an actual execution
would not serve the public policy justification for providing finality and vindication
to the victim’s family. Nevertheless, it seems that this undue delay between the
scheduled and actual execution—oftentimes caused by unfettered executive discre-
tion in signing warrants and scheduling executions—could be determined a violation
of the Eighth Amendment.378
CONCLUSION
While the practice has lasted centuries, scholars are united on the sentiment that
capital sentencing in the United States will likely be abolished at some point in the
not-so-distant future. However, scholars continue to debate how we will reach this
destination.
As this Article explained, the answer seems to be hiding in the history of capital
sentencing—incrementalism. Just as the current capital sentencing landscape has
been refined since 1972 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia,
there are several ways in which the system may be further refined through gradual
changes to slowly approach the ultimate abolishment of capital sentencing. This
Article defined those changes—further limiting the pool of defendants eligible to be
sentenced to death, reducing the number of defendants actually sentenced to death,
and refining the way executions are conducted. Implementing these gradual changes
will affect other factors that will also lend to the successful abolishment of capital
sentencing, including societal support, which is inherent in the guiding standard for
reviewing whether capital sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment. With each of
these changes, the system will get closer an closer to the inevitable abolition.
374 Kent Faulk, Walter Leroy Moody Executed for 1989 Bombing that Killed Judge Robert
Vance, AL.COM (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2018/04
/execution_of_alabamas_oldest_d.html [https://perma.cc/GR43-LJ6R].
375 Berman, supra note 322.
376 Faulk, supra note 374.
377 Id.
378 For more on reasons behind the delay in executions—specifically the process by which
defendants are forced to litigate last minute warrant- and execution-related claims—see
generally Kalmanson, supra note 337.
